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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
- A Florida sales tax on aviation fuel purchased by for-
eign airlines for use exclusively in international traffic
does not unconstitutionally impair the power of the fed-
eral government to regulate foreign commerce. Wardair
Canada Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 106 S. Ct. 2369
(1986).
For many years, Florida has imposed a tax on fuel
purchased by airlines operating within its borders.' Prior
to April, 1983, Florida prorated the sales tax applicable to
air carriers on a mileage basis.2 As such, an airline owed
only the portion of the otherwise payable tax that repre-
sented the ratio of its Florida mileage to its worldwide
mileage for the previous fiscal year.8 Because interna-
tional air carriers traveled only briefly in Florida air space,
they paid a small amount of state tax on fuel purchased in
Florida.4
Effective April 1, 1983, the Florida legislature substan-
tially amended its fuel tax scheme by repealing the mile-
, FLA. STAT. § 212.08(4) (1971). The tax was denominated as an excise tax im-
posed on the privilege of engaging in the business of selling tangible personal
property, including fuel, rather than as a property tax or user fee. Although the
tax was imposed upon the fuel supplier, the supplier was required by statute to
pass the tax on to the purchaser as a sales tax. The purchaser ultimately bore the
economic incidence of the tax. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 212.62(2) (West Supp. 1986).
2 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 212.08(4) (West 1971).
SId. In approving the proration formula, the Florida Supreme Court stated
that "Florida would only tax that portion of commerce activity that occurred
within the state," thus preventing the state from "exceeding its powers to tax in-
terstate and foreign commerce." Tropical Shipping & Constr. Co. v. Askew, 364
So. 2d 433, 435 (Fla. 1978) (statute providing for partial exemption for vehicles
and vessels engaged in foreign commerce based on ratio of miles traveled within
the state upheld).
4 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 5, Wardair Canada, Inc. v.
Florida Dep't of Revenue, 106 S. Ct. 2369 (1986) [hereinafter Amicus Curiae
Brief].
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age proration formula for airlines.5 The new amendment
imposed a five percent fuel tax on all aviation fuel drawn
from Florida storage facilities.8 The legislature fully taxed
all fuel purchased in Florida regardless of whether it was
used in intrastate, interstate or foreign commerce and
provided no provisions for apportionment.7 The amend-
ment substantially increased the tax liability of interna-
tional carriers engaged exclusively in foreign commerce.8
Wardair Canada, a Canadian corporation operating
round-trip international airline charter programs between
Canada and the United States, was seriously affected by
Florida's tax amendment.9 Wardair Canada regularly
purchased significant quantities of aviationjet fuel in Flor-
ida for consumption by airplanes in international com-
merce en route from Miami.10 Wardair Canada claimed to
be exempt from state taxes on aviation fuel by virtue of
a Fr. STAT. ANN. § 212.08(4)(a)(2) (West Supp. 1986). The amendment left
the proration formula in effect for railroads and vessels engaged in interstate or
foreign commerce. Id
o FLA. STAT. ANN. § 212.62(3)(a)(3) (West Supp. 1986). The designated tax of
$1.148 per gallon was based on a calculated average price rather than the actual
price per gallon of aviation kerosene, and resulted in a levy of 5.7 cents per gal-
lon. Id at § (3)(a)(2).
' FLA. STAT. ANN. § 212.62(3)(a)(2) (West Supp. 1986). Wardair Canada ini-
tially asserted that the failure to provide for reasonable apportionment of the tax
and to fairly relate the tax to services provided foreign airlines made the tax un-
constitutional based on the test outlined in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,
430 U.S. 274, 279 (1979). For a discussion of the Complete Auto test, see infra notes
81-83 and accompanying text.
a Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 4, at 5. EffectiveJuly 1, 1985, Florida further
amended its taxation scheme to exempt aviation fuel from sales tax while impos-
ing a new excise tax. The amount of the levy will remain approximately the same;
however, the new excise tax applies to aviation fuel sold in the state or brought
into the state for use. Air carriers may be eligible for a refund not to exceed six-
tenths of one per cent of wages paid by the carrier to employees located within the
state. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 206.9855 (West Supp. 1986). The refund provision pro-
vides little relief since few international carriers base employees in the state of
Florida. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 4, at 5 n.4.
9 Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 4, at 3-4. Wardair Canada operates under a
CAB authorized foreign air carrier permit issued pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 1372
(1982). Although Wardair did not engage in intrastate or interstate flights within
the United States and scheduled service solely from Miami (a primary domestic
gateway for foreign air traffic), it was subjected to the excise tax each time it
purchased fuel within Florida. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 4, at 3-4.
10 Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 4, at 4.
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explicit provisions in the United States/Canadian Non-
scheduled Airline Services Agreement' and by virtue of
reciprocal tax exemptions provided to international air
carriers by both the Chicago Convention12 and the Fed-
eral Aviation Act.' 3
Wardair Canada sought declaratory and injunctive re-
lief in circuit court against the application of Florida's fuel
tax. 14 Wardair contended that the tax was inconsistent
with federal aviation policy as expressed in Article 24 of
the Chicago Convention '5 and Section 1502 of the Fed-
eral Aviation Act, 16 and that the state-imposed tax was un-
"i Nonscheduled Air Services Agreement, May 8, 1974, United States-Canada,
25 U.S.T. 787, T.I.A.S. No. 7826. In order for an international air carrier to oper-
ate air transportation within the United States, its home country must enter into a
bilateral agreement with the United States government outlining the specific ser-
vice to be provided, and receive authorization and permits. The term of the per-
mit depends upon the continuation of the international bilateral agreement. The
Nonscheduled Air Services Agreement governs charter airline service between the
United States and Canada. For a discussion of the terms of the Agreement, see
infra notes 116-123 and accompanying text.
12 Convention on International Civil Aviation, opened for signature December 7,
1944, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago
Convention].
is Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1552 (1982). Wardair Can-
ada relied specifically on Section 1502 of the Federal Aviation Act in its argument
of an overarching federal policy of reciprocal tax exemptions for international air
carriers. See infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
14 See Florida Department of Revenue v. Wardair Canada, Ltd., 455 So. 2d 326
(Fla. 1984), afJd, 106 S. Ct. 2369 (1986). Nineteen international airlines domiciled
in North America, Central America, South America and the Caribbean also chal-
leged the tax amendment in Leon County Circuit Court. The Second Circuit con-
solidated the cases, but issued its final judgment and opinion as to Wardair's
action separate from the others. The judgment and opinions involving Wardair
were appealed separately. Id at 327.
1- Chicago Convention, supra note 12, art. 24(a) states in relevant part:
Aircraft on a flight to, from, or across the territory of another con-
tracting State shall be admitted temporarily free of duty, subject to
the customs regulations of the State. Fuel, lubricating oils, spare
parts, regular equipment and aircraft stores on board an aircraft of a
contracting State, on arrival in the territory of another contracting State
and retained on board on leaving the territory of that State shall be exempt
from customs duty, inspection fees, or similar national or local duties
and charges.
(emphasis added).
,o 49 U.S.C. § 1502 (1982). For a discussion of the provisions of Section 1502,
see infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
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constitutional under both the Supremacy 7 and foreign
Commerce Clauses of the Constitution. 8 The circuit
court did not declare the tax unconstitutional, but found
that the tax as applied to the airlines was inconsistent with
the undertakings of the United States government in its
executive bilateral agreements and accordingly granted a
permanent injunction. 19 The court stated that the "Fed-
eral Government must speak with one voice when regulat-
ing commercial relations with foreign governments, 20
and that to allow the fifty states to impose individual state
taxes would infringe upon federal power to regulate for-
eign commerce. 21
Upon cross-appeals from the circuit court's judgment,
the Florida District Court of Appeals certified the case di-
rectly to the Florida Supreme Court, which reversed the
lower court's ruling.22 The Florida Supreme Court re-
jected Wardair Canada's Supremacy Clause argument
that Florida's sales tax was preempted by the Nonsched-
uled Air Service Agreement. 28 The court found that the
bilateral aviation agreement addressed only national taxes
17 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. This clause states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State
to the contrary notwithstanding.
is U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. This clause states in relevant part: "Congress
shall have Power ... [t]o regulate Commerce with the foreign Nations..." Id.
,o See Florida Department of Revenue v. Wardair Canada, Ltd., 455 So. 2d at
327. The opinion of the Leon County circuit court is unreported. The circuit
court recognized that the bilateral aviation agreements in evidence had been ne-
gotiated at various times over a 40 year period and dealt with fuel taxes in differ-
ent terms, but that the agreements overall evidence a well-settled federal policy
favoring reciprocal tax exemptions. This policy was designed to establish uni-
formity, to prevent retaliatory taxes and to further the free flow of international
aviation. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 4, at 7.
20 Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 4, at 7 (quotingJapan Line, Ltd. v. County of
Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 436 (1979)). For a discussion ofjapan Line in dormant
Commerce Clause analysis, see infta notes 84-104 and accompanying text.
21 Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 4, at 7.
22 Florida Department of Revenue v. Wardair Canada, Ltd., 455 So. 2d at 327.
:s Id. at 328-29.
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and did not preclude a state's power to tax.24 In rejecting
Wardair Canada's argument that Florida's excise tax vio-
lated the foreign Commerce Clause, the court held that
Florida's tax neither created a substantial risk of interna-
tional multiple taxation nor prevented the federal govern-
ment from "speaking with one voice when regulating
commercial relations with foreign governments. 25
Wardair Canada appealed to the United States Supreme
Court which noted probable jurisdiction. Held, affirmed:
A Florida sales tax on aviation fuel purchased by foreign
airlines for use exclusively in international traffic does not
unconstitutionally impair the power of the federal govern-
ment to regulate foreign commerce. Wardair Canada, Inc.
v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 106 S. Ct. 2369 (1986).
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Preemption Doctrine:
The Supremacy Clause 27 mandates that federal law
overrides a state regulation where there is an actual con-
flict between the two sets of legislation.28 In addition,
where Congress acts pursuant to a plenary power, it may
specifically prohibit parallel state legislation and thereby
24 Id. at 329. The court also reasoned that competitive equality would be de-
stroyed if United States carriers were required to pay state excise taxes on fuel
purchases while Canadian carriers were exempted from such tax. Id
25 Id. (quotingJapan Line, 441 U.S. at 451). The court reasoned that Wardair
had not made a de facto showing of the risk of multiple taxation. Id. The court
also assumed that Congress intentionally limited the exemptions to national taxes,
so that a state tax would not contradict federal policy. Id For a discussion of the
Japan Line test of the validity of a statute under dormant foreign Commerce
Clause analysis, see infia notes 84-104 and accompanying text.
2a Wardair, 106 S. Ct. at 2371-72. Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme
Court was invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1982). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2),
jurisdiction is invoked when a state court upholds a state statute against a conten-
tion of invalidity on federal grounds.
2? U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2. For a complete text of the Supremacy Clause, see
supra note 17.
28 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66 (1940) (Federal Alien Registration Act
of 1940 precludes enforcement of Pennsylvania's Alien Registration Act of 1930
due to supremacy of national power in the general field of foreign policy).
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occupy the field.29 Although Congress seldom articulates
a specific intent to preempt an entire field of regulation, it
may impliedly occupy the field by demonstrating the req-
uisite intent.30 A court may infer intent from the perva-
siveness of the federal scheme and the need for
uniformity within the field.31 The judicial branch has
shouldered the responsibility for discovering congres-
sional intent and invalidating state laws which impermissi-
bly interfere with the effectuation of congressional
objectives.32
At the center of the preemption argument is the issue of
congressional intent.33 The United States Supreme Court
in Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation
& Dev. Comm'n 3 enunciated a test to apply in the absence
of preemptive language.35 According to Pacific Gas, con-
gressional intent to supersede state law "may be found
from a scheme of federal regulation so pervasive as to
make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room
to supplement it .... 6 If the legislative history illus-
trates clear evidence of congressional intent to preserve
dual regulation, however, the Court will not find the level
of pervasiveness needed to justify federal preemption of
- Ia at 66-67. Congressional enactment of uniform national immigration laws
occupied the field so as to preempt state regulation. Id.
so Id. There is a strong presumption favoring the validity of state regulation
and Congress must provide a clear indication in the language of the statute or in
the legislative history describing the purpose of the federal action. J. NOWAK, R.
ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, CONsTrrUrONA. LAw § 9.4 (3rd ed. 1986). For a complete
discussion of the doctrine of preemption, see id. §§ 9.1 - 9.4 (1986).
31 Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956) (federal anti-communist legisla-
tion supersedes Pennsylvania's Sedition Act). In Nelson, the Supreme Court enun-
ciated a three-pronged inquiry to ascertain preemption parameters: (1) the
pervasiveness of the federal regulatory scheme; (2) federal occupation of the field
as necessitated by the need for national uniformity; and (3) the danger of conflict
between state and federal law. Id at 502-09.
32 Hines, 312 U.S. at 67.
33 See J. NovAs, R. ROTUNDA, AND J. YOUNG, supra note 30, at § 9.4. (determin-
ing congressional intent).
-461 U.S. 190 (1983).
5 Id. at 203-04.
SO Id. (quoting Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141,
153 (1982)).
[52
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state regulation. 7
The Supreme Court reaffirmed this doctrine in Silkwood
v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 38 holding that the constitutionality of
an Oklahoma punitive damages statute was not pre-
empted by federal law.39 The Court reasoned that unless
Congress evinces an intent to occupy the given field
through pervasive regulation or an express provision,
state law falling within the field is not preempted. In
Silkwood, the Court held that although the federal govern-
ment retained exclusive authority to regulate safety stan-
dards within a particular industry, the states may continue
to provide remedies for damages based on state stat-
utes.41 In instances where there is no actual conflict be-
tween federal and state law, and where the congressional
statute does not expressly preempt state law, the Supreme
Court requires clear evidence of congressional intent to
preempt all state regulation of the specific field covered
by the statute.42
B. Preemption in the Area of Foreign Air Commerce
The federal government through the Federal Aviation
Act of 19584s has asserted regulatory power over foreign
? Id. at 221-23. In addressing the issue of federal preemption of state authority
to impose conditions for the construction of nuclear power plants, the Court in
Padfic Gas held that the California statute was not preempted by the Atomic En-
ergy Act. The Court found clear evidence of congressional intent to preserve dual
regulation of nuclear-powered generators in subcommittee debate on the Atomic
Energy Act. Id.
s 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
so Id at 258. The federal legislation in question in Silkwood was the Atomic
Energy Act, which provided for private involvement in the development of atomic
energy. Id. at 249. The Court in Silkwood found that "the only congressional dis-
cussion concerning the relationship between the Atomic Energy Act and state tort
remedies indicates that Congress assumed that such remedies would be avail-
able." I&. at 251.
4 Id at 248.
41 Id at 256.
42 Id at 248. Through statutory construction based on a review of legislative
history, the Silkwood Court concluded that Congress intended that persons injured
in nuclear accidents were free to utilize state law remedies. Id at 256.
43 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1552 (1982).
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air commerce in the areas of licensing,44 competition,
45
rates,46 tariffs47 and safety.48 The highly structured and
strictly controlled governmental plan for foreign air com-
merce has survived the complete deregulation of the do-
mestic field of air transport.49 Congress continues to
shape foreign air commerce directly, through regulation
pursuant to the Federal Aviation Act, and indirectly,
through the extensive power delegated to the Department
of State to negotiate air transport agreements with for-
eign nations.50
Through the enactment of Section 1502(a) of the Fed-
eral Aviation Act of 1958, Congress requires the Depart-
ment of Transportation to regulate foreign air commerce
in accordance with any treaty, convention or agreement
that may be in force.5 1 While Section 1502(a) mandates
uniformity of policy, Section 1502(b) seeks a fully compet-
itive foreign air transportation system with as few restric-
tions as possible.5 2 Prior to Wardair, the ability of state or
44 See id. at § 1372 (licensing provision lists requirements for foreign air
permits).
43 See id. at § 1502(b) (goal of international aviation policy to achieve greatest
degree of competition that is compatible with a well-functioning international air
transportation system).
4o See id. at § 1374(b) (prohibits unjust discrimination and unreasonable preju-
dice in foreign air transportation rates). See also id. at § 1482(o (federal govern-
ment retains power to adjust any discriminatory or prejudicial foreign rate).
4* See id. at § 1373 (provisions regarding filing, posting and observance of tariffs
and rebates).
4s See id at § 1421 (provisions granting authority over safety regulations in air
commerce).
-' Brief for Appellant Wardair Canada, Inc. at 37, Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Flor-
ida Dep't of Revenue, 106 S. Ct. 2369 (1986) [hereinafter Brief for Appellant].
Id at 37-38.
3, 49 U.S.C. § 1502(a) (1982) (Congress intended that the Secretary of State
and the Secretary of Transportation exercise their powers consistently with any
obligation assumed by the United States in any treaty, convention or agreement
currently in force).
2 49 U.S.C. § 1502(b) (1982). In passing Section 1502(b), Congress intended
to foster the "greatest degree of competition that is compatible with a well-func-
tioning international air transportation system." In order to accomplish this goal,
Congress endorsed a negotiating policy that advocated the elimination of opera-
tional and marketing restrictions as well as discriminatory and unfair competitive
practices. The goals of Congress were to increase the number of gateway cities,
integrate international and domestic air transportation, and provide opportunities
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local governments to impose additional regulations over
foreign air commerce was unclear. I3 The Federal Avia-
tion Act does not expressly preempt state regulation of
foreign air commerce.54 In the area of taxation, Sections
1513(a) and (b) of the Federal Aviation Act specifically
outline accepted and prohibited state and local taxes. 55
According to the standards of Pacific Gas56 and Silkwood,57
however, the federal government may still impliedly oc-
cupy the field of international air commerce if the requi-
site intent is demonstrated.58
The legislative history of Section 1513 dearly demon-
strates that Congress carefully considered tax alternatives
for foreign carriers to increase their access to points within the United States.
Congressional policy specifically endorsed the "fewest possible restrictions on
charter air transportation." Id Wardair argued that state taxation of the instru-
mentalities of foreign commerce violated congressional intent as set forth in Sec-
tion 1502(b).
as See Scandinavian Airlines Systems, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 56 Cal. 2d
1 1, 363 P.2d 25, 14 Cal. Rptr. 25, cerL denied, 368 U.S. 899 (1961) (ad valorem
property tax levied by California upon aircraft owned, based and registered
abroad and used exclusively in foreign commerce is unconstitutional under the
Commerce Clause). But see Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. County of Alameda, 12 Cal.
3d 772, 528 P.2d 56, 117 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1974) (apportioned property taxation of
containers owned by domestic corporation and used in intercoastal and foreign
commerce upheld).
54 The Federal Aviation Act does not specifically refer to either "state regula-
tion" or "preemption" in outlining acceptable and prohibited taxes. See 49 U.S.C.
§ 1513 (1982). 49 U.S.C. § 1305 (1982) states that "no State ... shall enact or
enforce any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision having the force
and effect of law relating to rates, routes or services of any air carrier having au-
thority under this . . . Act. . . ." This does not limit a state in the exercise of its
proprietary powers and rights. IM at § 1305(b)(1).
55 Section 1513(a) expressly prohibits state taxation of persons traveling in air
commerce (head charges) and taxation of the gross sales receipts of airlines. Sec-
tion 1513(b) expressly permits a state to levy property taxes, franchise taxes, and
sales or use taxes on the sale of goods or services.
In Padfit Gas, the Supreme Court held that it could infer congressional intent
to preempt all state regulation based on the degree of pervasiveness of the federal
legislation. Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 204.
57 In Silkwood the Supreme Court reiterated that in the absence of an express
provision, the legislative history must evince clear congressional intent to occupy
a given field. Although there is no actual conflict, the state law may not stand as
an obstacle to the accomplishment of federal objectives. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 248.
58 For a discussion of preemption by congressional implication, see supra notes
34-42 and accompanying text.
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prior to enactment.5 9 The initial Senate proposal for Sec-
tion 1513 would have prohibited all direct or indirect
taxes on air transportation, but the individual states,
through the National Association of State Aviation Offi-
cials, complained that this sweeping provision would pro-
hibit unobjectionable taxes such as landing fees, fuel
taxes, and sales taxes on food provided to airline passen-
gers.60 Both the CAB and the FAA also objected on
grounds that local governments would be deprived of tax
revenues for maintenance of municipal airports.61  To
quiet these concerns, members of Congress assured offi-
cials that the prohibition would apply only to "head
taxes" and that the purpose of the bill would be clari-
fied.62 After thorough debate in both House and Senate
hearings, the committees recommended compromise
59 See Airport Development Acceleration Act: Hearings on S. 2397 Before the Subcomm on
Aviation of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 129-198 (1972) [here-
inafter Senate Hearings]; see also Airport Development Acceleration Act" Hearings on H.R&
2337 Before the Subcomm. on Transportation and Aeronautics of the House Comm. on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) [hereinafter House Hear-
ings). In Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,
405 U.S. 707 (1972), the United States Supreme Court upheld a local "head tax."
The nation's airlines could be required by state or local statute to collect and
remit a per-person passenger charge for the use of airport facilities in order to
reduce subsidies required of residents who do not use the airport. The negative
response to this ruling prompted congressional hearings on local taxation of air
transportation, and resulted in the enactment of the Airport Development Accel-
eration Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-44 § 7(a), 87 Stat. 90 (1973) (now codified as
amended at 49 U.S.C. § 1513 (1982)). Section 1513(a) preempts a limited number
of state taxes, including "head taxes."
- S. 3611, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) (broad prohibition of all direct or indi-
rect state taxes on air transportation); H.R. 2337, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971)
(similar prohibition). Local aviation officials opposed the broad nature of tax
prohibitions proposed by the bills submitted to Congress. House Hearings, supra
note 59, at 91 (statement ofJohn A. Nammack, Executive Vice President, National
Association of State Aviation Officials).
a' Senate Hearings, supra note 59, at 138 (statement of Whitney Gilliland, Vice
Chairman, CAB); id at 140-41 (statement of Ronald W. Pulling, Acting Associate
Administrator for Plans, FAA). The opponents of this version of the bill argued
that municipalities depended upon taxes to help defray the costs of airport con-
struction and maintenance. Id
62 See House Hearings, supra note 59, at 99. A "head tax" is a per-person tax on
passengers traveling in air commerce. A passenger may be taxed each time an
airplane lands at an airport regardless of whether the passenger disembarks. ll
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As enacted, Section 1513(a) prohibits "head charges"
on airline passengers as well as taxes on gross sales re-
ceipts of airlines. 64 The Supreme Court clarified the
scope of Section 1513 (a) in Aloha Airlines v. Director of Taxa-
tion of Hawaii65 by declaring that Hawaii's state tax on the
gross income of the airlines operating within its borders,
while styled as a property tax measured by gross receipts,
was preempted by the specific language of Section
1513(a).66 The Hawaii Supreme Court inferred that Sec-
tion 1513(a) had been enacted out of congressional con-
cern that a proliferation of local taxes would unduly
burden the interstate air transportation system. 7 The
- See House Hearings, supra note 59, at 109. The Airport and Airways Devel-
opment Act, Pub. L. 91-258, 84 Stat. 219 (1970), specifically required the airport
sponsor to maintain a fee and rental structure for the facilities and services being
provided for airport users which would make the airport as self-sustaining as pos-
sible. IM at 115. The final bill attempted to eliminate the discriminatory practice
of "per person" taxing while allowing airports a reasonable means of collecting
revenue. Id at 117.
As enacted, Section 1513(a) provides that:
No State ... shall levy or collect a tax, fee, head charge, or other
charge, directly or indirectly, on persons traveling in air commerce
or on the carriage of persons traveling in air commerce or on the
sale of air transportation or on the gross receipts derived therefrom
A tax on the annual gross income of airlines operating within a state as a means
of taxing the airline's personal property was specifically preempted by this statute.
For a discussion of preemption of taxes on annual gross income, see infra notes
65-68.
6s 464 U.S. 7 (1983).
- Id. at 12. The state of Hawaii had subjected Aloha Airlines, a commercial
airline carrying passengers, freight and mail, to a public service company tax of
four percent of its yearly gross income. Hawaii stated that the tax was enacted as a
means of taxing the tangible and intangible personal property of the airline, in-
cluding its value as a going concern. Aloha Airlines sought a refund for taxes
assessed between 1974 and 1977 on the grounds that 49 U.S.C. § 1513(a) had
preempted the Hawaii statute. The Supreme Court held that although the tax was
styled as a property tax, it was in fact a tax upon the gross sales receipts of the
airline. As such it was preempted by the specific language of § 1513(a). Aloha
Airlines, 464 U.S. at 10-11.
a? Aloha Airlines, at I 1-12. The Hawaii Supreme Court attempted to uphold the
statute by looking beyond the direct language of Section 1513(a) to Congress'
purpose in enacting the statute. The court concluded that if Section 1513(a) was
passed to eliminate the proliferation of "head taxes," then a tax imposed upon air
carriers rather than air travelers would be valid. The United States Supreme
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Supreme Court rejected this reasoning and held that even
an indirect tax on an airline's gross receipts was pre-
empted by Section 1513(a)68
While Section 1513(a) expressly prohibits specific taxes
on air transportation and related services, Section
1513(b) reserves to the states to the right to impose cer-
tain other taxes as primary sources of revenue.89 The
statute allows a state to levy property taxes, franchise
taxes, and sales or use taxes on the sale of goods or serv-
ices; 70 however, this provision of the Federal Aviation Act
has never been expressly extended to foreign carriers."
The Federal Aviation Act defines "air commerce" to in-
clude "interstate, overseas and foreign air commerce. 72
In congressional hearings, State Department and Legisla-
tive Council members advised that the term "air com-
merce" encompassed "foreign and overseas air
commerce. ' s  The legislative history is devoid of evi-
dence of congressional intent to limit the tax provisions to
state taxation of interstate commerce while prohibiting
taxation of foreign air commerce. 4 However, the custom
Court rejected this reasoning and held that Section 1315(a) expressly prohibited
states from directly or indirectly taxing gross receipts derived from air transporta-
tion. Aloha Airlines, 464 U.S. at 14.
Aloha Airlines, 464 U.S. at 14.
As enacted, Section 1513(b) provides that:
Nothing in this section shall prohibit a State ... from the levy or
collection of taxes other than those enumerated in subsection (a) of
this section, including property taxes, net income taxes, franchise
taxes, and sales or use taxes on the sale of goods or services. .. "
70 l1& Property taxes, however, may not exceed the tax rate applicable to com-
mercial or industrial property in the same assessment jurisdiction. Aloha Airlines,
464 U.S. at 10-11.
71 Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 106 S. Ct. 2369, 2372
(1986). Because the Court found it plausible that Congress did not intend for the
provisions of Section 1513 to be applicable to foreign air carriers, it did not rely
on this section to resolve Commerce Clause issues raised by Wardair. Id.
72 49 U.S.C. § 1301(4) (1982); 49 U.S.C. § 1310(10) (1982).
" See Senate Hearings, supra note 59, at 136, 207; House Hearings, supra note
59, at 35-37.
74 See Senate Hearings, supra note 59, at 136; House Hearings, supra note 59, at
35-37. Since the State Department and the Senate Legislative Council advised
Congress that "air commerce" encompassed foreign air commerce, Congress was
aware that foreign as well as domestic carriers would be affected. Wardair, 106 S.
Ct. at 2377.
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of the industry has dearly differentiated between domes-
tic and foreign carriers in allowing tax exemptions for the
latter.75
C. The Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause: Limitations.on
State and Local Taxation
It is a long-accepted constitutional doctrine that the
Commerce Clause, without the aid of congressional regu-
lation, affords some protection from state legislation that
is adverse to national commerce. A state is not free to
impose demonstrative burdens on interstate or foreign
commerce even though Congress has not preempted the
field by affirmative regulation." Dormant Commerce
Clause power exists to protect interstate commerce from
unconstitutional discrimination by the states. 78 When the
Court, as final arbiter, seeks to decide the extent of per-
missible state regulation in light of a dormant Commerce
Clause power, it is, in effect, attempting to interpret the
meaning of congressional silence when the state inter-
venes in an area where the primary power is traditionally
held by Congress. 9
When a state or local tax is measured against the dor-
mant Commerce Clause, the Court seeks to allow the state
or locality to extract from interstate commerce a fair share
of the expenses of state and local government without un-
duly restricting the flow of interstate commerce.80 In Com-
,' Brief for Appellant, supra note 49, at 29-30. Foreign carriers have generally
been exempted from taxes in a effort to encourage foreign trade and commerce,
and out of fear of retaliatory taxes against American carriers abroad. Id
7- J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA ANDJ. YOUNG, supra note 30, § 8.1, at 261.
7 See Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 773 (1945) (Arizona Train
Limit Law imposes a serious burden on interstate commerce in that it materially
impedes movement of interstate trains and interposes a substantial obstruction to
the national policy of economical and efficient transportation service).
8 Id. at 767.
- See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Dumond, 336 U.S. 525, 530-39 (1949) (a state
may not promote its own local economic advantage by curtailing the volume of
interstate commerce; denial of license for additional milk processing plant
unjustified).
- See infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
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plete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,8' the Court fashioned the
modern four part test: a state or local tax on interstate
commerce is permissible under the dormant Commerce
Clause if: (1) it is "applied to an activity with a substantial
nexus to the taxing state, (2) it is fairly apportioned, (3)
[it] does not discriminate against interstate commerce,
and (4) [it] is fairly related to the services provided by the
State."182  In enunciating this test, the Supreme Court
overturned a system which had previously allowed a blan-
ket prohibition of any state tax imposed directly on an in-
terstate transaction.8"
The Supreme Court subsequently outlined an addi-
tional constitutional analysis to be employed in instances
where a state seeks to tax the instrumentalities of foreign
commerce. In Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles,84
California imposed an ad valorem property tax on the
cargo shipping containers of six Japanese maritime com-
panies. 85 The Court assumed, arguendo, that California's
property tax would pass the nexus, apportionment and
nondiscrimination tests of Complete Auto86 and thus would
a, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
2 hI. In Complete Auto, a Mississippi tax on the privilege of doing business
within the state was held not to violate the Commerce Clause when it was applied
to an interstate activity such as transportation by motor carrier to Mississippi car
dealers of cars manufactured outside the state. Id
83 See Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951) (Supreme
Court held that interstate commerce should enjoy a "free trade" immunity from
state taxation); see also Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946) (application of Indi-
ana tax upon the receipt of the entire gross income of residents and domiciliaries
held unconstitutional due to doctrine of tax immunity for interstate securities
transactions. Indiana had sought to impose this tax on income generated from
the sale of out-of-state securities). The decision by the Court in Complete Auto
overturned the "Spector Rule." Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 283-89.
441 U.S. 434 (1979).
Id. at 436-37.
The County of Los Angeles argued that the containers had a substantial
nexus with the state because some containers were present within the state at all
times. Id. at 445. The county argued further that the tax was fairly apportioned
because it was levied only on the containers' average presence within the state,
and it fell evenhandedly on all personal property within the state. Id Since Cali-
fornia provided essential fire and police protection, as well as the benefits of a
trained work force, the tax was fairly related to the services provided by the state.
Id For a discussion of the Complete Auto standard, see supra notes 80-83 and ac-
companying text.
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be valid under the dormant Commerce Clause if the con-
tainers were instrumentalities of purely interstate com-
merce. 87 Because the containers were instrumentalities of
foreign commerce, however, the Court held that it was
necessary to answer two additional questions in assessing
the tax's validity: "[first, whether the tax, notwithstand-
ing apportionment, creates a substantial risk of interna-
tional multiple taxation, and second, whether the tax
prevents the Federal Government from speaking with one
voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign
governments.18 8 If a state tax contravenes either of these
precepts, the Court held, it is unconstitutional under the
Commerce Clause.89 The Court concluded that Califor-
nia's tax failed both of these tests.90 Since the containers
were taxed on their full value in Japan, California's levy
necessarily caused international multiple taxation. 91 In
addition, the imposition of charges on cargo containers
used exclusively in international traffic frustrated the at-
tainment of federal uniformity.92
In determining that the taxation of cargo containers
was a subject necessitating a uniform national rule, the
Court relied on two principal considerations. First, since
Japan did not tax American-owned containers, the Court
noted that California's tax created an asymmetry in the
international tax structure operating to Japan's disadvan-
87 Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 446.
- lad at 451. The Court rejected the argument that the Commerce Clause anal-
ysis is identical for both interstate and foreign commerce. Ma at 446. The Court
cannot ensure full apportionment when one of the taxing entities is a foreign sov-
ereign; therefore, the risk of multiple taxation is enhanced. Id. at 447. Addition-
ally, a state tax that affects foreign commerce may impair federal uniformity in an
area where federal uniformity is essential. Id- at 448.
8 l. at 451.
Id. at 451, 453-54.
d l.L at 451-52. The Court also rejected California's argument that it should
not be foreclosed from taxation because Japan had elected to tax the containers in
full. Japan had the right to tax the containers at their full value. While the Court
can demand apportionment of taxes in the interstate commerce context, it is pow-
erless to correct malappropriations in foreign commerce. Id. at 447.
2 L. at 452-53. The Court emphasized that foreign commerce is a matter of
national concern and that the taxation of foreign commerce necessitates a uni-,
form national rule. Id. at 448-49.
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tage.9" The Court stated that a state tax on foreign com-
merce must be evaluated in the realistic framework of the
customs of nations. 4 In international practice, aircraft
and ships engaged in foreign traffic were immune from
taxation except in their country of origin or nation of reg-
istry.95 Because cargo shipping containers were consid-
ered to be instrumentalities of international traffic, Japan
taxed these containers with the legitimate expectation
that they would not be taxed elsewhere. 6 Furthermore, if
the state tax created an asymmetry, foreign nations disad-
vantaged by the levy could retaliate against American-
owned instrumentalities present in their jurisdiction.9 '
While the Court noted that some nations provided a tax
exemption only if a reciprocal tax exemption was
granted, 98 the Court felt that a retaliatory tax would be
directed at all American transportation equipment and
not just the taxing state, so that the nation as a whole
would suffer.99
The Customs Convention on Containers, a multina-
tional agreement between the United States and Japan,
composed the Court's second factor evincing the neces-
sity of uniformity. 100 The agreement provided that con-
tainers temporarily imported into the United States were
to be admitted duty free. 10' Although Congress had not
93 Id. at 453. If a state imposes an apportioned tax, international disputes over
the apportionment formula may arise. Id at 450. Because the containers in ques-
tion were in fact taxed in Japan, California's levy constituted double taxation. i
at 452.
-Id at 454.
- Id. at 447 n.l 1. This practice was known throughout the international com-
munity as the "home port doctrine." Id. at 442-43.
Si at 454. A multinational agreement entered into between Japan and the
United States designated the Japanese containers as instruments of international
traffic. See Customs Convention on Containers, May 18, 1956, United States-Ja-
pan, art. 1(b), 20 U.S.T. 301, 304, T.I.A.S. No. 6634.
9' Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 450.
98 Id. at 453 n.18. When apprised of California's tax, the European Economic
Community began consideration of "suitable counter-measures." lI
i at 453.
,eo Customs Convention on Containers, May 18, 1956, United States-Japan, 20
U.S.T. 301, T.I.A.S. No. 6634.
101 i at 304. The agreement grants containers "temporary admission free of
1987] CASENOTES AND STATUTE NOTES
expressly preempted the field by affirmative regulation,
the Court did not find this fact dispositive, since the Com-
merce Clause affords protection from state legislation in-
imical to national commerce. 0 2 The Court reasoned that
the multinational agreement reflected a national policy to
remove impediments to the use of containers as instru-
ments of international traffic, and that allowing the Cali-
fornia tax would frustrate the free flow of national
commerce.' 03 In invalidating California's tax on foreign-
owned containers, the Supreme Court held that a state, by
its unilateral act, could not place impediments before the
nation's conduct of its foreign relations and its foreign
trade. 0 4
D. National Policy Limitations on State Taxation
Aviation relations with foreign governments are imple-
mented through a system of treaties and bilateral execu-
tive agreements. 0 5 These agreements produce a pattern
of reciprocal tax exemptions not only for aircraft, but also
for equipment and supplies which constitute the instru-
mentalities of foreign commerce. 0 6  For instance, the
Chicago Convention, 0 7 a treaty binding the United States
and 156 other signatory nations, reflects an accepted in-
ternational policy of reciprocal tax exemptions.108 Article
import duties and taxes and free of import prohibitions and restrictions" if the
containers are used solely in foreign commerce and are subject to re-exportation.
Id
10Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 454.
1os Id at 453.
104 ML
os 49 U.S.C. § 1502(a) (1982) requires compliance by the Secretary of Trans-
portation with all treaties, conventions and agreements which may be in force be-
tween the United States and foreign countries.
106 The pattern of reciprocal tax exemptions is illustrated by provisions of the
various international agreements. See, e.g., Customs Convention on Containers,
supra notes 100-101; Chicago Convention, supra note 15, art. 24(a); United
States/Canada Nonscheduled Air Service Agreement, art. XII, infra notes 117-
118.
-07 See supra note 12.
- Chicago Convention, supra note 12, art. 24(a) endorses specific tax exemp-
tions for fuel retained on board foreign aircraft; however, the Convention did not
attempt to deal comprehensively with tax questions. Id. at 1186. See Dempsey, The
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24(a) of the Chicago Convention provides that fuel, lubri-
cating oil, spare parts, regular equipment and aircraft
stores retained on board an aircraft shall be free from na-
tional or local duties.10 9 This provision, however, refers
only to fuel retained on board an aircraft and does not
apply to fuel purchased from suppliers in the foreign
country." 0 Therefore, a local tax on fuel purchased in a
foreign country could conceivably not violate the Chicago
Convention.
The United States is a member of the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) by virtue of participa-
tion in the Chicago Convention."' The Air Transport
Committee of the ICAO undertook a comprehensive
study of problems related to international air transport
taxation and subsequently adopted resolutions designed
to reduce, to the extent possible, all forms of taxation on
the sale or use of the instrumentalities of air commerce." 2
In 1966, the ICAO Committee adopted a resolution which
stated that fuel, lubricants and other consumable techni-
cal supplies taken on board an aircraft for consumption
during an international flight would be exempt from all
Role of the International Civil Aviation Organization on Deregulation, Discrimination and
Dispute Resolution, 52J. AIR L. & COM. 529, 554 (1987).
,-9 For a complete text of article 24(a), see supra note 15.
- Chicago Convention, supra note 12, art. 24(a) limits the exemption to fuel
"on board an aircraft... on arrival in the territory ... and retained on board on
leaving the territory .... "
I See Chicago Convention, supra note 12, arts. 43-66. The ICAO, an organiza-
tion established by the convention to lessen discrimination between the signato-
ries, promotes development of all aspects of international civil aeronautics. The
ICAO has advocated the removal of all taxes on foreign airlines on a reciprocal
basis. Under the ICAO policies, only the nation in which the carrier is headquar-
tered would be allowed to impose significant taxes. See Dempsey, supra note 108,
at 554.
"2 See Dempsey, supra note 108, at 555. The Air Transport Committee, an
ICAO subgroup, undertook a comprehensive study of existing and anticipated
problems related to international air transport taxation, since the Chicago Con-
vention itself did not attempt to deal comprehensively with tax matters. The reso-
lutions drafted by the Air Transport Committee and adopted by the ICAO in
1951 addressed the taxation of fuel, income, and aircraft, as well as sales or use
taxes on international air transportation. Id. The purposes of the resolutions
were to prevent multiple taxation and to restrict tax liability of carriers to the
nation where the carrier was headquartered. Id.
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customs and other duties, or alternatively, any duties
would be refunded. 1 s The ICAO Council explained that
this resolution endorsed the longstanding maritime prac-
tice of reciprocal tax exemptions. 1 14 While the resolution
itself has never been formally adopted in the United
States, most of the signatories to the Chicago Convention
have substantially implemented its terms. 115
Because a Canadian carrier challenged the constitution-
ality of Florida's fuel tax, it is important to note that the
United States has entered into an executive bilateral
agreement with Canada governing the system of non-
scheduled, or charter, air transportation between the two
countries.1 16  Article XII of the United States/Canada
Nonscheduled Air Services Agreement provides that each
contracting party must exempt carriers of the other con-
tracting party to the fullest extent possible from excise
taxes, inspection fees, duties or other charges on fuel
taken on board an aircraft within the other country's terri-
tory intended solely for use in interriational services.' 17
11 The 1951 Resolutions were essentially reaffirmed by the ICAO in 1966. See
ICAO's Policies on Taxation in the Field of InternationalAir Transport, ICAO Doc. 8632-
C/968 (Nov. 1966) [hereinafter ICAO Policies]. The Council Resolution on Tax-
ation of Fuel, Lubricants, and Other Consumable Technical Supplies (Reaffirmed
by Council Resolution Nov. 14, 1966) Sec. 1 states:
(1) When an aircraft registered in one State arrives in the territory
of another State, the fuel, lubricants, and other consumable techni-
cal supplies contained in the ... aircraft shall be exempt from cus-
toms or other duties;
(2) When an aircraft... departs ... the fuel, lubricants and other
consumable technical supplies taken on board for consumption dur-
ing the flight should be furnished exempt from all customs or other
duties ....
The resolution defined "customs" and "other duties" to include "import, ex-
port, excise, sales, consumption and international duties and taxes of all kinds
levied upon the fuel, lubricants and other consumable technical supplies by taxing
authority within a state." Id para. 4.
14 See Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 4, at 11.
." See Dempsey, supra note 108, at 556 n.103.
"o See supra note 11.
I' Article XII(1)(c) of the Air Service Agreement, supra note 11, negotiated and
executed on behalf of the United States by the Department of State pursuant to 49
U.S.C. § 1462 (1986), provides that the airlines of the United States and Canada
are:
exempt... to the fullest extent possible under national law from
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Each contracting party must grant the exemption whether
or not the fuel was consumed wholly within" the other
country's territory." 8
Canada has interpreted the Nonscheduled Air Service
Agreement as endorsing provincial taxation of fuel and
has rejected the international practice of reciprocal tax ex-
emptions.'1 9 Canadian provincial governments impose
taxes on aviation fuel purchased within their borders and
do not grant exemptions for fuel purchased by foreign
airlines for use in foreign commerce. 20 The tax rates va-
ried from province to province in April 1983, when Flor-
ida enacted its levy, ranging from a low of 1.9 cents per
gallon in Newfoundland to a high of 13.55 cents per gal-
lon in British Columbia.' 2 ' The rates represented ap-
proximately 2-15% of the total purchase price paid by a
United States carrier. 22 Two provinces, Quebec and Al-
berta, exempted foreign airlines from tax. 23
In the thirty-eight years since the Chicago Convention,
the United States has signed bilateral aviation agreements
with more than seventy countries. 24 Almost all of the bi-
import restrictions, customs duties, excise taxes, inspection fees, and
other national duties and charges on fuel ... taken on board aircraft
of the carriers of one Contracting Party in the territory of the other
Contracting Party and intended solely for use in international air
services... whether or not such items are consumed wholly within
the territory of the Contracting Party granting the exemption.
Is Id.
" Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 4, at 4-5.
120 Id. Although Canadian provinces have levied sales tax on aviation fuel for
many years, no formal complaints have been lodged by United States air carriers.
The reason for the absence of complaint is that the principal Canadian destina-
tions of Montreal, Calgary and Edmonton lie in the two provinces, Quebec and
Alberta, that exempt foreign carriers from fuel tax. Toronto, the chief destination
in the province of Ontario, imposes a fuel tax, but the refinery price for jet fuel in




124 See, e.g., Aviation Transport Services Agreement, Oct. 24, 1956, United
States-Colombia, art. 7(d), 14 U.S.T. 429, T.I.A.S. No. 5338; Air Transport Serv-
ices Agreement, Aug. 15, 1960, United States-Mexico, art. 7(d), 12 U.S.T. 60,
T.I.A.S. No. 4675; Air Transport Agreement, Apr. 13, 1953, United States-Vene-
zuela, art. 4(c), 4 U.S.T. 1495, T.I.A.S. No. 2813; Air Transport Services Agree-
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lateral agreements obligate the United States to exempt
the designated airlines from customs, duties, excise taxes
and inspection fees to the fullest extent possible.1 25 In ac-
cording reciprocal exemptions for aviation fuel taken on
board foreign aircraft within this country, the bilateral
agreements typically refer to national duties or federal
taxes.' 2 None of the bilateral aviation agreements explic-
itly prohibit state or local taxes on aviation fuel used by
foreign airlines in international traffic.127 To that extent,
the bilateral agreements do not reflect the full scope of
federal aviation policy as evidenced by the ICAO
Resolutions.1 28
II. WARDAIR CANADA, INC. V. FLORIDA DEP'T OF REVENUE
In Wardair, the Supreme Court confronted the issue of
whether the Federal Aviation Act, by express language or
pervasive policy, preempted Florida's tax on aviation fuel
purchased by international air carriers.129 The Court re-
lied primarily on its power of statutory interpretation in
rejecting Wardair's argument that Congress, through the
Federal Aviation Act, had decreed that the federal govern-
ment, Sept. 22, 1947, United States-Argentina, § F(2,3), 29 U.S.T. 2795, T.LA.S.
No. 8978.
12 The agreement between the United States and Mexico obligates each coun-
try to:
exempt the designated... airlines of the other Contracting Party to
the fullest extent possible under... national law, on the basis of
reciprocity, from import restrictions, customs duties, excise taxes,
inspection fees, and other national duties and charges on fuel, lubri-
cants. ... and other equipment and supplies used in international air
service.
Air Transport Service Agreement, Aug. 15, 1960, United States-Mexico, art. 7(d),
12 U.S.T. 60, T.I.A.S. No. 4675 (emphasis added).
120 See i4 Other agreements refer to charges "imposed by national authorities,"
or "federal taxes." Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 4, at 15.
1, Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 4, at 17.
128 The ICAO Resolution, supra note 113, prohibits the imposition of import,
export, excise, sales, consumption and other international duties by any taxing au-
thority within a state. The ICAO Resolutions, however, have never been formally
adopted by the United States. Wardair Canada, 106 S. Ct. at 2374.
12 Wardair Canada, 106 S. Ct. at 2370. For a discussion of the standards re-
quired for federal preemption of state legislation, see supra notes 27-42 and ac-
companying text.
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ment has exclusive regulatory power over foreign air com-
merce.13 0 While acknowledging that Congress regulated
aviation extensively through the Federal Aviation Act, the
Court construed its provisions as expressly permitting
state taxes.13' The Court interpreted Section 1513(a) of
the Federal Aviation Act as expressly prohibiting specific
state taxes, s3 2 while Section 1513(b) expressly permitted
state "sales or use taxes on the sale of goods or serv-
ices.''"s To the Court, the fuel tax was plainly a "sales tax
on the sale of goods" within the language of Section
1513(b) and was therefore a permissible tax.'3 4 Because
the statute did not expressly declare state law to be pre-
empted, the Court found no conflict between state and
federal law.' 35 Neither did it find a system of regulation
so pervasive as to "occupy the field" of international avia-
tion according to the standard of Pacific Gas.13 6
As set forth in Silkwood, evidence of congressional in-
tent to preempt must be present in order to set aside a
state law as unconstitutional.13 7  Because of the express
language of Section 1513(b), the Court interpreted con-
- Wardair asserted that Florida's tax violated a "clear unequivocal directive of
Congress" that is implicit in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. The Court con-
strued the Federal Aviation Act and concluded that the federal government had
not asserted exclusive regulatory power over foreign air commerce through that
legislation. Wardair Canada, 106 S. Ct. at 2370.
131 Id at 2372.
1- The states were prohibited from assessing head charges on passengers trav-
eling in air commerce and taxing the gross receipts of air carriers derived from the
sale of air transportation. For a discussion of the terms and implications of Sec-
tion 1513(a), see supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
1s The states were permitted to impose property taxes, net income taxes,
franchise taxes, and sales or use taxes on the sale of goods or services. For a
discussion of the terms and implications of Section 1513(b), see supra notes 69-71
and accompanying text.
- Wardair Canada, 106 S. Ct. at 2372.
1"5 Id
13, According to Pacific Gas, congressional intent to preempt state law may be
"found from a scheme of federal regulation so pervasive as to make reasonable
the inference that Congress left no room to supplementit." Pacific Gas, 461 U.S.
at 203-04. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of Pacific
Gas. Because the Federal Aviation Act expressly reserved to the states certain
avenues of taxation, the Court did not find the degree of pervasiveness needed for
preemption. Wardair Canada, 106 S. Ct. at 2372.
-' Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 248.
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gressional intent as explicitly permitting state taxation on
the sale of goods. 5 8 Wardair argued, however, that Con-
gress drafted the provisions of Section 1513 to apply ex-
clusively to domestic carriers and did not consider
whether states would be permitted to tax foreign carri-
ers."' 9 Because the Court found this argument plausible,
it did not rely on the preemption analysis to answer ques-
tions raised by the dormant foreign Commerce Clause. 140
In its dormant foreign Commerce Clause analysis, the
Court's concern centered on the policy of uniformity
rather than on an actual conflict between federal and state
law. 14 ' Wardair did not dispute that the tax met the test
of Complete Auto.' 42 Wardair also recognized that the tax
created no threat of multiple international taxation ac-
cording to the standard of Japan Line, since the tax was
imposed upon the sale of fuel in only one jurisdiction.4s
Wardair relied exclusively upon the final factor identified
in Japan Line: the effect of the local rule on the ability of
the federal government to speak with one voice in regulat-
ing areas of national rather than local concern.'" In ar-
no Wardair Canada, 106 S. Ct. at 2372. Section 1513(b) expressly stated that
"nothing in this section shall prohibit a State... from the levy or collection of taxes
other than those enumerated in [1513](a) ... including.., sales or use taxes on
the sale of goods or services. . ." (emphasis added). For a discussion of Section
1513(b), see supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
,so Wardair Canada, 106 S. Ct. at 2372. Although Section 1301(4) of the Federal
Aviation Act defines "air commerce" to include "interstate, overseas or foreign
air commerce," the Court only expressly extended to the states the power to tax
domestic, rather than foreign carriers. For this reason, the Court did not base its
opinion solely on grounds of preemption. Id
340 Id Wardair Canada also challenged Florida's tax on the ground that it im-
permissably interfered with the federal government's ability to uniformly regulate
foreign commerce. Because this issue was raised, the Court was forced to analyze
the tax on dormant foreign Commerce Clause grounds. Id
141 Id at 2379. Florida's tax did not actually conflict with the provisions of Sec-
tion 1513(b) of the Federal Aviation Act. For a discussion of the terms of Section
1513(b), see supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
142 Wardair Canada, 106 S. Ct. at 1273. For a discussion of dormant Commerce
Clause analyis according to the standard of Complete Auto, see supra notes 80-83
and accompanying text.
14 Wardair Canada, 106 S. Ct. at 2373. See supra notes 84-99 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the additional test, outlined in Japan Line, to be applied
when a state taxes the instrumentalities of foreign commerce.
144 Wardair Canada, 106 S. Ct. at 2373. For a discussion of the role of uniformity
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guing that the Florida tax compromised the federal
government's ability to uniformly regulate commerce,
Wardair emphasized that international air commerce is an
area of national concern.1 45 Wardair analogized aviation
fuel to the cargo containers in Japan Line and argued that
federal policy granted tax exemptions to instrumentalities
of foreign commerce.1 46 A state tax would frustrate the
attainment of federal uniformity.
Wardair Canada contended that Section 1502(a) and
(b) of the Federal Aviation Act,147 Article 24(a) of the Chi-
cago Convention,148 the Resolution adopted November
14, 1966, by the ICAO, 9 and more than seventy bilateral
agreements'50 , including the United States/Canada Non-
scheduled Airline Services Agreement, entered into by
the United States with various foreign countries all mani-
fest a policy of uniform reciprocal tax exemptions.' 5' In
reviewing the documents, however, the Court did not find
governmental silence that triggers dormant Commerce
Clause analysis.1 52 In fact, the Court found that the fed-
eral government had acted affirmatively in delineating
permissible and prohibited state taxes in Section 1513(a)
in dormant Commerce Clause analysis, see supra notes 88-104 and accompanying
text.
143 Wardair Canada, 106 S. Ct. at 2373.
146 Id. Wardair argued that a policy of reciprocal tax exemptions existed for the
aircraft, equipment and supplies that constitute the instrumentalities of interna-
tional air traffic, and that this federal policy of uniformity was threatened by Flor-
ida's tax. I at 2372-74.
147 For a discussion of the terms of Section 1502 of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958, see supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
14a For a complete text of art. 24(a) of the Chicago Convention, see supra note
15.
140 See supra note 113 for a discussion of the terms of the Resolution adopted by
the ICAO.
-50 For a discussion of the terms of the bilateral agreements governing interna-
tional aviation, including the Canadian Nonscheduled Airline Services Agree-
ment, see supra notes 117-128 and accompanying text.
,s Wardair Canada, 106 S. Ct. at 2374.
le ta at 2374. On the contrary, the Court found that the cited legislation and
international agreements demonstrated that the federal government had acted af-
firmatively in legislating acceptable state taxes. Md.
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and (b) of the Federal Aviation Act. 153
In considering the evidence, the court determined that
the current law allows taxation of the sale of fuel by polit-
ical subdivisions of countries. '  The Court relied on the
express language of Article 24(a) of the Chicago Conven-
tion.155 Article 24(a) prohibits taxes on fuel when the fuel
is on board the aircraft upon arrival and retained on
board when leaving a foreign country, but does not pro-
hibit taxation of fuel purchased within that country.15 6
The Court concluded that the parties of the Chicago Con-
vention were aware of the negative implications of state
and local taxation, and addressed the problem by cur-
tailing some aspects of the localities' power to tax while
implicitly preserving other aspects of that authority.' 57
The Court discarded the ICAO Resolution's endorse-
ment of tax exemptions on fuel because the Resolution
had not been specifically endorsed, approved, or passed
by either the executive or legislative branch of the federal
government.-58 The Court characterized the ICAO Reso-
lution as a policy of an organization of which the United
States is one of many members, rather than as a policy of
the United States.' 59 After reviewing more than seventy
bilateral agreements between the United States and for-
eign countries, the Court found that none of the docu-
ments deny the individual states the power to tax.' 60
- For a complete text of Section 1513, see supra notes 64-70 and accompany-
ing text.
'- Wardair Canada, 106 S. Ct. at 2374. In reviewing the Conventions and inter-
national agreements, the Court found that while there appeared to be an interna-
tional aspiration to eliminate all impediments to foreign air travel, the law
acquiesced in taxation of the sale of fuel. Id
" See id For a complete text of art. 24(a) of the Chicago Convention, see supra
note 15.
,5 See supra note 15.
,5 Wardair Canada, 106 S. Ct. at 2374.
" Id at 2374-75.
Iso For a discussion of the ICAO Resolution in question, see supra notes 11 I
115 and accompanying text.
mo Wardair Canada, 106 S. Ct. at 2375. For an example of the bilateral agree-
ments that were submitted for review by the Court, see supra notes 124-128 and
accompanying text.
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Rather, most of the agreements prohibit the imposition of
national taxes.186  Similarly, the United States/Canada
Nonscheduled Air Services Agreement limits the tax ex-
emptions afforded to the other nation's carriers to na-
tional duties and charges, but does not mention whether
taxation by political subdivisions is exempt.16 2 The Court
interpreted this omission as a policy choice to allow state
taxation.163
The Court also noted the Canadian policy of provincial
taxation of fuel.'6 Although it did not consider this
course of conduct dispositive, the Court interpreted it as
evidence of an understanding among all parties to permit
taxation by political subdivisions. 65  According to the
Court, the evidence dearly demonstrated an affirmative
governmental choice not to preclude local taxation.' 66
Since dormant Commerce Clause analysis was not trig-
gered, the Court accordingly did not address whether the
Commerce Clause would invalidate Florida's tax in the
absence of the international agreements.8 7
In his concurrence, ChiefJustice Burger concluded that
Congress fully considered the scope of state taxation in
the area of air commerce before passing Section 1513(b)
in its current form.' 68 Justice Burger also concluded that
16, Wardair Canada, 106 S. Ct. at 2375. For text of the United States-Mexico Air
Service Agreement regarding exemption from taxation, see supra note 125.$62 See supra note 117 for the complete text of the United States-Canada Non-
scheduled Air Service Agreement, art. XII(l)(c).
1- Wardair Canada, 106 S. Ct. at 2375.
164 Id
I65 Id The Court pointed out that the ICAO Resolution had addressed the
problem of state and local taxation eight years before the United States and Can-
ada signed the Nonscheduled Air Services Agreement. Id. Because the parties
did not prohibit state and local taxes, and because Canadian provinces routinely
impose such taxes, the Court interpreted the Agreement as permitting this type of
taxation. Id
to Id. at 2373. The dormant Commerce Clause ensures that the channels of
foreign commerce are not impermissibly burdened in the absence of congres-
sional action. Because the Court interpreted the air service agreements and the
Federal Aviation Act as affirmative acts by Congress to allow state taxation, dor-
mant Commerce Clause analysis is inapplicable. Id. at 2375.
Id7 /d
261 Id at 2376. Justice Burger relied heavily on the legislative history of Section
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Congress realized that the provisions of the bill would en-
compass foreign and overseas commerce. 169 In reaching
this conclusion, he relied upon the Federal Aviation Act's
general definition of air commerce as including "inter-
state, overseas or foreign air commerce."' 70 Justice Bur-
ger would have decided the case on the basis of
preemption and disregarded dormant Commerce Clause
issues.171
In his dissent, Justice Blackmun expressed the view that
Florida's tax violated the dormant Commerce Clause be-
cause the taxation of international aviation fuel necessi-
tated a uniform national rule. 7 2 Justice Blackmun found
this case indistinguishable from Japan Line.'7 He stressed
that "[flor a state regulation to be removed from the
reach of the dormant Commerce Clause, the intent of the
federal government to permit state activity must be un-
mistakably clear."' 74 According to Justice Blackmun, the
case lacked the required evidence of affirmative congres-
sional approval of state taxation. 1
75
In Justice Blackmun's opinion, the federal govern-
ment's efforts in diplomacy reveal an "overarching and
1513 in reaching his conclusion that Congress did not intend to preempt state
legislation. Id at 2376-77. For a discussion of the legislative history of section
1513, see supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
1 9 Wardair Canada, 106 S. Ct. at 2377.
170 Id at 2377-78. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text for a discussion
of Federal Aviation Act definitions upon which Justice Burger based his opinion.
,, Wardair Canada, 106 S. Ct. at 2378. In Justice Burger's opinion, the plain
language of Section 1513 of the Federal Aviation Act authorized Florida's fuel tax.
By engaging in dormant Commerce Clause analysis, the Court was filing "to
honor the choice already made by Congress following extensive consideration of
the problem.... ." Id
172 I
- Id, See supra notes 84-104 and accompanying text for a discussion of'Japan
Line. Justice Blackmun asserted that Florida's tax on fuel, like California's tax on
shipping containers used exclusively in foreign commerce, would prohibit the fed-
eral government from "speaking with one voice" when regulating foreign com-
merce. Wardair Canada, 106 S. Ct. at 2378.
,14 Wardair Canada, 106 S. Ct. at 2378. Justice Blackmun contended that "not
prohibiting" a state tax is different from "affirming" a state tax. Id at 2378-79. In
the absence of congressional affirmation, the burden placed on foreign commerce
was too great. Id
1I7 at 2378-79.
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coherent policy" of granting reciprocal tax exemptions. 176
In his view, the fact that treaty provisions stop short of
banning state taxes did not demonstrate the absence of
federal policy, but simply meant that the United States
had not yet succeeded in transforming the policy into
law.177 Justice Blackmun interpreted the documents to re-
veal a federal policy to eliminate impediments to foreign
air travel.178 According to Justice Blackmun, the majority
ruling hinders the United States in efforts to obtain recip-
rocal tax immunity and undermines current reciprocity
agreements. 179
III. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The Wardair decision represents a setback for State De-
partment officials who made aggressive efforts over the
years to implement the policy of reciprocal tax exemp-
tions both internationally and domestically. In a series of
letters addressed to the Florida Department of Revenue
beginning in 1982, the State Department noted that it was
surprised and distressed to learn of Florida's proposal for
an extension of state taxes.180 It emphasized that state
taxes would undermine and frustrate the international
system of reciprocal tax exemptions and thereby signifi-
cantly increase the cost of international air transportation
for consumers."8
The Solicitor General of the United States, as Amicus
Curiae, voiced the specific concerns of the State Depart-
ment. 182 According to the Solicitor General, if the foreign
170 Id. at 2379.
177 Id
178 Id. at 2378. Justice Blackmun rejected the view that once the federal govern-
ment has spoken at all in an area, the Commerce Clause operates to permit states
to act unless such action is expressly prohibited. Id
'' Id
'8 Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 4, at 21-22.
18, Id. In 1982, the State Department wrote the tax departments of various
states, including Florida, after receiving protests from Great Britain. After the fuel
tax extension in 1983, the State Department contacted Florida again and warned
of serious foreign relations problems that could develop. Id
182 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant, No.
[52
1987] CASENOTES AND STATUTE NOTES
domicile granted reciprocity, Florida's action would invite
retaliatory taxation against United States' carriers. 8 3 Such
retaliation would be felt by the nation as a whole. 84 In
the past, United States airlines have encountered a variety
of discriminatory measures abroad. 18 5
Alternatively, if a foreign domicile does not grant recip-
rocal exemptions, the imposition of state or local taxes
could undercut negotiations by the United States
designed to rectify the problem of discrimination. 86 Due
to state assessment of local taxes, the United States could
not offer equal reciprocity in return.18 7 This denial of
equal reciprocity will inevitably frustrate the federal ob-
jective of achieving and maintaining reciprocal tax
advantages. 88
Prior to trial, the federal government received diplo-
matic notes from twenty-five foreign countries protesting
Florida's tax on aviation fuel. 8 9 The diplomatic notes
uniformly pointed to the "international consensus" and
"established international practice" of granting reciprocal
tax exemptions as evidenced by the 1966 ICAO Resolu-
tion and the bilateral aviation compacts. 90 The notes
urged the federal government to take the diplomatic steps
84-902, Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 106 S. Ct. 2369 (1986)
[hereinafter Amicus Curiae Brief II].
les Id at 7.
1$4 Id
185 Id at 10. Discriminatory measures imposed on United States carriers in the
past include the levy of artificially inflated user fees, the imposition of obstacles to
repatriation of foreign earnings, the routing of airlines to less desirable airports,
the refusal to allow carriers to use baggage handlers of choice, the award to local
airlines of preference in carrying air cargo, the imposition of restrictions on
United States airlines' local advertising, and the infliction of excessively compli-
cated customs procedures and bureaucratic red tape. Id
,as Id at 7.
187 Id
tas fd
89 See Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 4, app. la-58a. These countries included
Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, France,
West Germany, Honduras, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Nor-
way, Panama, Spain, Switzerland, Trinadad and Tobago, United Kingdom, and
Yugoslavia. Id
o In the notes each nation expressed the concern that the tax would threaten
her air carriers' ability to function economically under current tax and trade
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necessary to effect a resolution of the problem. 91
Despite the defeat of State Department objectives, the
majority opinion emphasized the Court's concerns that all
airlines deserve equal treatment and that state statutes
should not discriminate against domestic airlines in favor
of foreign airlines competing on the same route system.
Since the Court had denied review of a similar suit filed by
domestic carriers challenging the constitutionality of Flor-
ida's tax,192 the State of Florida asserted that to limit the
tax would destroy competitive equality between domestic
and foreign carriers by requiring Florida to grant the lat-
ter a tax subsidy that their domestic competitors did not
enjoy.' 93 A continued tax exemption would indeed grant
foreign airlines a "tax holiday" in the purchase of aviation
fuel, equipment and supplies on which their domestic
competitors would have to pay tax. United States air car-
riers would in turn have a tax holiday abroad because of
the symmetrical nature of the reciprocal exemption pol-
icy. The Court, however, preferred to characterize the tax
based on its impact on international commerce according
to the Complete Auto standard.194 According to this stan-
dard, Florida's tax did not cause asymmetry in the inter-
national tax structure since the tax provided equal and
symmetrical treatment of foreign and domestic airlines in
the taxation of sales of fuel purchased within a state. 95
agreements. Iceland, for example, expressed the fear that the tax might force her
carriers to seek alternative destinations. Id at app. 27a.
19, The notes emphasize the spirit of reciprocity that is the basis for interna-
tional air operations. Id at app. 31 a.
19 See Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Florida Department of Revenue, 445 So. 2d 317
(Fla. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 214 (1986). Delta Airlines, Capitol Air, North-
west Airlines, Ozark Air lines, Piedmont Aviation, Republic Airlines, The Flying
Tigers, United Airlines and USAir challenged Florida's fuel tax as an unconstitu-
tional violation of the Commerce Clause. The Florida Supreme Court upheld the
tax as applied to domestic carriers, and the United States Supreme Court refused
to hear the case.
R' Brief for Appellee at 5, Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue,
106 S. Ct. 2369 (1986) [hereinafter Brief for Appellee].
-' For a discussion of the Complete Auto standard, see supra notes 80-83 and
accompanying text.
RoB rief for Appellee, supra note 193, at 5. According to the Complete Auto stan-
dard, a tax is unconstitutional if it discriminates against interstate commerce. In
[52
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The Court considered the tax to be dearly neutral in its
treatment of foreign airlines and consistent with the Com-
merce Clause objective of non-discriminatory treatment
of interstate carriers. 196
The decision also represented a realistic approach to lo-
cal governments' need to raise revenue for the mainte-
nance of airports. Florida's need for state collection of
revenue to keep local airports self-sufficient was balanced
against the need for federal uniformity, resulting in a
practical approach to raising revenue. Prior to the 1973
OPEC oil embargo, fuel was inexpensive and readily avail-
able, and state taxing authorities had little reason to re-
gard international aviation as a potential source of
revenue. 197 The price of fuel has risen roughly 700%
since the OPEC oil embargo, and states realized that they
could use a sales tax on an essential commodity to combat
the increasing costs of airport maintenance and
development. '1
Regardless of whether the decision in Wardair was a
positive move toward equality of treatment for all air car-
riers or a retaliatory response to Canadian taxation of
fuel, the case will inevitably impact the international com-
munity. The holding will place the United States in con-
flict with the spirit of the international agreements and
the established international practice of providing exemp-
tions from fuel taxes. The Court has unmistakably found
congressional intent to reserve to the states a primary
source of revenue; however, the decision in Wardair may
this case, Florida taxed foreign carriers at the same rate that it taxed domestic
carriers. I&
- See id at 5-6. Wardair argued that the tax operated "automatically" to the
disadvantage of foreign carriers. The Court, however, found that foreign carriers
were treated equally since the tax was applied evenly to all carriers. I&
1' See Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 4, at 18.
- IM at 18-19. The price of bonded fuel rose sharply following the OPEC
embargo because bonded fuel must be manufactured from crude oil purchased
abroad. In contrast, the price of fuel manufactured from domestic crude oil
dropped, and foreign carriers began to shift from bonded fuel to domestically
produced aviation kerosene. As domestic consumption increased, the states rec-
ognized that this newly created market could provide a source of revenue. Id at
18 n.21.
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prove to be detrimental to the overall development of in-
ternational aviation, and may also result in a confusing ad-
ministrative situation with the possibility of widespread
aviation fuel taxes on worldwide basis.
Nancy Dearing
FEDERAL AVIATION ACT - GRANT OF EXCLUSIVE
RIGHT TO OPERATE AT A FEDERALLY FUNDED AIRPORT -
Imposition of uniquely discriminatory lease provisions on
applicants for airport space grants incumbent airport les-
sees an exclusive right to operate at a federally funded air-
port in violation of section 1349(a) of the Federal Aviation
Act. City of Pompano Beach v. FAA, 774 F.2d 1529 (1lth
Cir. 1985).
On May 30, 1979, aviator James Brettman filed an ap-
plication with the city of Pompano Beach, Florida, re-
questing permission to lease ten to twelve acres at the
Pompano Beach Air Park (Air Park).' Pursuant to the
city's minimum standards, Brettman planned to rent han-
gar and storage space to the owners of small, single and
twin-engine airplanes.2 The city responded to Brettman's
I City of Pompano Beach v. FAA, 774 F.2d 1529, 1532 (1lth Cir. 1985). Pom-
pano Beach received title to the Air Park, originally a World War II Naval facility,
pursuant to the Surplus Property Act of 1944, 50 U.S.C. app. § 1622(g) (1982).
Section 1622(g) provides that "[n]o exclusive right for the use of the airport at
which the property disposed of is located shall be vested (either directly or indi-
rectly) in any person or persons to the exclusion of others in the same class." Id.
The city's deed to the Air Park also specified that the land "shall be used for
public airport purposes, and only such purposes, on reasonable terms and without
unjust discrimination and without grant or exercise of any exclusive right for use
of the airport within the meaning of Section 303 of the Civil Aeronautics Act of
1938." Pompano Beach, 774 F.2d at 1532 n.3. Section 303 has since been re-en-
acted and codified in the Federal Aviation Act at 49 U.S.C. app. § 1349(a) (1982).
See infra text accompanying notes 29-38 for the origins and purpose of section
303.
In Pompano Beach, the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) chose to pursue a remedy under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 308(a)
(codified at 49 U.S.C. app. § 1349(a) (1982)), rather than under section 1622(g)
or the deed of conveyance. 774 F.2d at 1532 n.3. Therefore, the focus of this
analysis is section 1349(a).
2 Pompano Beach, 774 F.2d at 1532. At the time of Brettman's application, there
were two fixed base operators (FBOs) at the Air Park providing hangar facilities
for rent: Pompano Aviation and Pompano Air Center. Pompano Aviation was
bought out by Executive Aviation two months later, and finally became Bec-Air in
September, 1981. Id. at 1535. John Becker, owner of Pompano Air Center and
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request by revising its minimum standards3 such that an
Air Park tenant could not rent out hangar space unless it
provided the full range of fixed-base operator (FBO)4
services.5 Thus began a course of conduct8 by the city of
father of Brian Becker, owner of Bec-Air, thought it unfair that Brettman be al-
lowed to operate hangar rentals without providing the full range of services main-
tained by the incumbent lessees: fuel service, parking facilities, line service, and a
flight school. Id. at 1533. Becker protested to the Pompano Beach Advisory
Board (Advisory Board), the organization initially responsible for approving
Brettman's application, that Brettman would siphon the incumbents' lucrative
hangar business while leaving them with the other, less profitable services. Id.
3 Id. at 1533 n.6. Prior to Brettman's request, the minimum standards used by
Pompano Beach to regulate the activities of Air Park tenants and fixed base opera-
tors had remained unchanged since 1967. The Air Park manager stated that re-
vised standards had been under development for some time, and on July 26,
1979, just two months after Brettman's original lease application, the Pompano
Beach City Commission officially adopted a new set of minimum standards. Two
days later, however, the city signed a new lease with Executive Aviation, later to
become Bec-Air (see supra note 2), which required adherence only to the 1967
standards. Id. at 1533.
4 A fixed base operation (FBO) is defined as one that "provides facilities, fuel,
equipment, supplies and services at an airport which are used by aircraft, crews,
passengers and in handling freight connected therewith. It is vital to air transpor-
tation." Alphin v. Henson, 392 F. Supp. 813, 816 n.4 (D. Md. 1975), a d, 538
F.2d 85 (4th Cir. 1976), modified on other grounds, 552 F.2d 1033 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1977)(quoting E. W. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Massachusetts
Port Auth., 362 F.2d 52, 53 n.2 (1st Cir. 1966)).
- Pompano Beach, 774 F.2d at 1533; see supra note 2 for a discussion of the serv-
ices offered at the Air Park by incumbent FBOs.
e Although the Advisory Board approved Brettman's application on September
11, 1979, the city notified Brettman that in order to qualify under its revised mini-
mum standards, see supra note 3 for background information on the city's revised
standards, Brettman had to operate as a FBO under one of five designated catego-
ries. Pompano Beach, 774 F.2d at 1534. Brettman complied by requesting a lease
under the "flight instructor" category and proposed a thirty-year term with a re-
quired minimum investment of $150,000. Id. The city counteroffered its "stan-
dard" lease: a new lease containing requirements not found in existing FBO
leases. lid; see infra note 24 for a list of the more restrictive clauses contained in
the "standard lease."
On February 10, 1981, after one year of futile negotiations, Brettman modified
his application and asked to operate at the Air Park as a full FBO on the same
terms as the two incumbent lessees. Pompano Beach, 774 F.2d at 1534. Pompano
Beach offered a twenty-year lease with a required investment of $200,000, and
conditioned acceptance on proof of Brettman's "financial responsibility." Id.; see
infra note 9 for a breakdown of the type of financial information requested.
Brettman counteroffered a lease identical to those held by Pompano Air Center
and Bec-Air and the city flatly refused to consider it. Pompano Beach, 774 F.2d at
1534. On June 23, 1981, the City Attorney wrote Brettman that he planned to
take no further action on Brettman's request. The Air Park manager advised
Brettman to "search for another airport with which to do business." Id.
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Pompano Beach which effectively thwarted Brettman's at-
tempts to gain access to the Air Park for over three years.7
From late 1979 to early 1983, in addition to changing
its minimum standards, the city developed a new "stan-
dard" lease, 8 requested that Brettman make detailed fi-
nancial disdosures,9 and refused to offer Brettman a lease
identical to those held by the two incumbent lessees,
Pompano Air Center and Bec-Air.10 Based on the city's
treatment of Brettman, the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion (FAA) issued a "Notice of Proposed Order" finding
the city in violation of federal law."1 Spurred to action,
Pompano Beach officials went to Washington, D. C., to
7 Brettman first requested access to the Air Park on May 30, 1979. The FAA
ordered Pompano Beach to offer him a non-discriminatory lease in the spring of
1984. Pompano Beach, 774 F.2d at 1532, 1558.
8 Id. at 1535; see infra notes 19 and 28 for a discussion of the FAA's findings with
regard to the city's "standard" lease. Though the city called this lease its "stan-
dard" lease, it had been modified three times since 1977. Pompano Beach, 774 F.2d
at 1535. The city claimed that the changes were made to incorporate its "evolving
concerns," and thus to ultimately protect the public interest. Id.
9 Pompano Beach, 774 F.2d at 1534. The city requested detailed financial infor-
mation concerning Brettman's proposed fixed base operation, including pro-
jected gross revenues and operating costs for each year of the lease; pricing
policies, and a proposed schedule of charges. Id. at 1535.
lo Id. at 1534; see supra note 2 for background information on the incumbent
lessees, Pompano Air Center and Bec-Air. Pompano Air Center and Bec-Air had
been operated essentially as a single business entity. Bec-Air provides no
mechanical services or maintenance to aircraft, and refers all repair work to Pom-
pano Air Center. The only aeronautical service Bec-Air provides is fuel. In con-
trast, Pompano Air Center provides a wide range of services, including flight
instruction, aircraft maintenance, fuel, oil, rental hangar storage space, outside
aircraft tiedown, and aircraft sales, and employs a staff of thirty to fifty persons.
Bec-Air employs only a clerk and two line persons, none of whom holds a profes-
sional Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) certificate. Pompano Beach, 774 F.2d
at 1535-36.
11 Pompano Beach, 774 F.2d at 1535. Specifically, the FAA charged Pompano
Beach with having unjustly discriminated against Brettman and having, in effect,
granted an exclusive right to the Beckers. Id. at 1555-36. The FAA's investigation
was instigated by Brettman, who filed a complaint with the FAA in July of 1981,
two years after his initial lease application. I& at 1534. See infra note 22 for a
detailed discussion of Brettman's communications with the FAA. The FAA fur-
ther warned the city that as a result of its conduct it faced several possible sanc-
tions, including ineligibility for future federal funding of the Air Park, imposition
of a civil penalty pursuant to 49 U.S.C. app. § 1471 (a) (1982), and loss of neces-
sary FAA approval on matters related to the use of the Air Park. Pompano Beach,
774 F.2d at 1536.
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defend their actions before FAA representatives. 12 The
FAA subsequently reviewed the city's "standard" lease,
the lease that Brettman had rejected several times
before, t3 and found the lease to "appear... reasonable
and not unjustly discriminatory."'' 4 It withdrew its "No-
tice of Proposed Order," but the withdrawal was contin-
gent on the city's promise to once again offer Brettman
the approved "standard" lease and to negotiate the finan-
cial terms, such as the amount of minimum investment re-
quired, in good faith.'5
Immediately thereafter, the city offered Brettman a
thirty-year lease and requested a minimum investment in
capital improvements of $500,000.16 FBOs operating at
the Air Park at the time had thirty-year leases which re-
quired minimum investments of no more than
$200,000.17 City officials told Brettman that the required
investment would be reduced only if he agreed to a shorter
12 Pompano Beach, 774 F.2d at 1586. City officials contacted their congressmen
and arranged for a meeting with FAA officials in one congressman's Washington,
D. C., office. Id. Brettman was not notified of the meeting, and later contended it
was an illegal ev parte attempt by Pompano Beach to influence the FAA's decision
on its "Proposed Order." Brief for Intervenor at 17, City of Pompano Beach v.
FAA, 774 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1985) (No. 84-5331).
IS Pompano Beach, 774 F.2d at 1536. The city offered Brettman its "standard"
lease at least four times: in December 1980, February 1981, November 1981, and
April 1982. Each offer consisted of a twenty-year term with a required minimum
investment of $200,000. Id at 1534.
14 Id. at 1536.
- Id. at 1537. "Financial terms" were defined as including "those terms of the
Lease which may have a direct impact on the financial viability of Mr. Brettman's
proposed operation and on his ability to compete on an equal basis with the ex-
isting operators." Brief of Petitioner at 9, City of Pompano Beach v. FAA, 774
F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1985) (No. 84-5331)[hereinafter Brief of Petitioner]. The
FAA recommended that any financial terms required by the city be "reasonable
and not unjustly discriminatory when compared to the financial terms of existing
(fixed base operator) leases at the airport." Pompano Beach, 774 F.2d at 1536.
,M Pompano Beach, 774 F.2d at 1537.
17 Id. at 1532, 1535. Pompano Beach claimed that, adjusted for inflation, Pom-
pano Air Center had made a cumulative investment at the Air Park of $1,016,781
and Bec-Air had made a cumulative investment of $550,060. Id. at 1536 n.8.
However, Pompano Air Center's thirty-year lease expressly required only a mini-
mum investment of $200,000, while Bec-Air's required only $100,000. Id. at 1532,
1535.
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lease term.18 Additionally, the city's revised minimum
standards, several of which changed the lease signifi-
cantly, 19 were attached to the lease.20 Although incorpo-
rated into the lease by reference, the standards
themselves had not been submitted to the FAA.21
Prompted by Brettman, the FAA notified Pompano
Beach that it did not feel the city was fulfilling its obliga-
tions.22 Pompano Beach disagreed, and on October 27,
1983, the FAA reissued its "Notice of Proposed Order."23
After a four day administrative hearing held in February
of 1984, the FAA found the lease offered Brettman to
contain provisions different from the leases offered other
lessees, and deemed it, therefore, discriminatory to
Brettman.24 The FAA's hearing officer concluded that the
is Id. at 1537.
19 See infra note 24 for a complete listing of the lease provisions that the FAA
hearing officer found to differ significantly. They include provisions relating to
transfer of control of the leased space, compliance with future standards, require-
ment of an initial deposit, disclosure of financial information and business plans
(see supra note 9), gasoline taxes,.amount of the required investment (see supra note
15 and accompanying text), effect of bankruptcy and liens on lease, advance city
approval of future construction, and the rental rate. Pompano Beach, 774 F.2d at
1537.
- Pompano Beach, 774 F.2d at 1537; see supra note 3 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the city's efforts to revise its minimum standards.
21 Pompano Beach, 774 F.2d at 1537. The city claimed that the omission of the
revised standards was an oversight and not intentional. Brief of Petitioner, supra
note 15, at 12-13.
2 Pompano Beach, 774 F.2d at 1537. Brettman originally contacted the FAA in
June of 1979, shortly after his first application was tabled by the Advisory Board.
After the city refused to offer him a full FBO lease in the spring of 1981, Brettman
then filed a complaint pursuant to 14 C.F.R. § 13.5(a) (1986) ("Any person may
file a complaint with the [Federal Aviation] Administrator with respect to anything
done.., in contravention of any provision of any Act... within the jurisdiction of
the Administrator") which led to the "Notice of Proposed Order" and subsequent
meeting between Pompano Beach and the FAA. See supra text accompanying
notes 11-15 for a discussion of the FAA's proposed order and subsequent investi-
gation of Brettman's complaint. Finally, Brettman informed the FAA that the city
had offered him the approved lease, but had also added the unapproved revised
standards. Pompano Beach, 774 F.2d at 1537.
2s Pompano Beach, 774 F.2d at 1537.
24 Id. at 1537-38 n.9. The hearing officer specifically found ten aspects of the
lease to be discriminatory:
(I) Amount of investment in capital improvements required of Brettman as dis-
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city had granted an "exclusive right ' 2 5 in violation of sec-
tion 1349(a) of the Federal Aviation Act.26 As a result, the
FAA ordered the city to cease unjustly discriminating
against Brettman and to offer him a lease containing pro-
visions "substantially identical" to those held by incum-
bent FBOs. 7 Pompano Beach petitioned the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit for re-
view, requesting that the order be vacated. 2s Held, and af-
firmed: Imposition of uniquely discriminatory lease
provisions on applicants for airport space grants incum-
bent airport lessees an exclusive right to operate at a fed-
erally funded airport in violation of section 1349(a) of the
Federal Aviation Act. City of Pompano Beach v. FAA, 774
F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1985).
tinguished from the amount required of other fixed base operators at the Air
Park;
(2) Changes and modifications, and their interpretation, of the "standards" and
"guidelines" attached to Brettman's lease;
(3) Transfer of control of Brettman's business or property, and lease condi-
tions limiting the sale, assignment, and/or sublease of the business or property;
(4) Compliance with minimum standards and future-imposed standards re-
quired of Brettman but not other lessees;
(5) Disclosure of confidential commercially valuable business information re-
quired of Brettman while other lessees exempted from that obligation;
(6) Brettman was required to operate a fixed base facility before being allowed
to rent hangar space, and was required under the city's standards to operate in
more than one category;
(7) Approval of several city administrative authorities required by Brettman
before he could construct new facilities, when such approval not required by
others;
(8) Discriminatory gasoline tax provisions imposed on Brettman;
(9) Deposit required by Brettman and not by others;
(10) Bankruptcy, lien and rental rate provisions of Brettman's lease unlike the
provisions contained in existing leases.
Id. at 1537 n.9.
25 See infra text accompanying notes 29-143 for a discussion of the legal inter-
pretation of "exclusive right" as used in section 1349(a) before the Pompano Beach
decision.
2o 49 U.S.C. app. § 1349(a) (1982); Pompano Beach, 774 F.2d at 1538.
27 Pompano Beach, 774 F.2d at 1538. The term "substantially identical" was not
specifically defined; see id.
2H Id.
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I. INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 1349(A)'s "EXCLUSIVE
RIGHT"
A. Legislative and Administrative Pronouncements
Congress originally passed section 1349(a) 29 into law as
§ 303 of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (CAB Act).30 It
viewed the aviation industry as a vital part of the nation's
transportation system, and, therefore, "invested with the
public interest."8 1 Accordingly, the goal of the CAB Act
was to promote the development, safety, and regulation
of civil aeronautics.3 2 The Act created the Civil Aeronau-
'o 49 U.S.C. app. § 1349(a) (1982). Section 1349(a) provides in relevant part:
There shall be no exclusive right for the use of any landing area or
air navigation facility upon which Federal funds have been ex-
pended. For the purposes of the preceding sentence, the providing
of services at an airport by a single fixed-base operator shall not be
construed as an exclusive right if it would be unreasonably costly,
burdensome, or impractical for more than one fixed-base operator
to provide such services, and if allowing more than one fixed-base
operator to provide such services would require the reduction of
space leased pursuant to an existing agreement between such fixed-
base operator and such airport.
Id.
-o Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, § 303, 52 Stat. 973, 986 (current ver-
sion at 49 U.S.C. app. § 1349(a) (1982)) [hereinafter CAB Act]; see also Pompano
Beach, 774 F.2d at 1541. See generally Lindsey, The Legislative Development of Civil
Aviation, 1938-1958, 28J. AIR. L. & CoM. 18 (1961) (background information on
the CAB Act and subsequent legislation).
Section 303 of the CAB Act was listed under Title III of the Act as one of the
"Powers and Duties of Administrator." The essence of section 303 is that no fed-
eral funds are to be expended on air navigation facilities and landing areas with-
out the written recommendation of the Administrator. CAB Act, supra note 30 at
§ 303, 52 Stat. at 986. The "exclusive right" prohibition was added with no ex-
press direction given for its subsequent enforcement. See, e.g., Hill Aircraft &
Leasing Corp. v. Fulton County, 561 F. Supp. 667 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (in determin-
ing whether Congress intended section 1349(a) to provide a private cause of ac-
tion against entities granted exclusive rights, the court noted that Congress had
not expressly designated beneficiaries of section 1349(a) and, in the court's view,
the provision was meant to "inure to the benefit of the general public").
s Beane, The Antitrust Implications of Airline Deregulation, 45 J. AIR L. & COM.
1001, 1001-02 (1980).
32 CAB Act, supra note 30 at § 2, 52 Stat. at 980. Section 2 of the CAB Act
declares the policy behind the Act to be as follows:
Sec. 2. In the exercise and performance of its powers and duties
under this Act, the Authority shall consider the following among
other things, as being in the public interest, and in accordance with
the public convenience and necessity -
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tics Authority (CAA) and, though safety was the CAB
Act's primary goal, the CAA was charged with the duty to
encourage and develop a national air transportation sys-
tem.a3 The CAA was to adapt the system to present and
future needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the
United States. 4
Along with the duty to adapt, the CAA was granted the
corresponding ability to authorize expenditure of federal
funds for the development of air navigation facilities and
landing areas.35 Section 303 of the CAB Act provided
(a) The encouragement and development of an air-transportation
system properly adapted to the present and future needs of the
foreign and domestic commerce of the United States... ;(b) The regulation of air transportation in such manner as to rec-
ognize and preserve the inherent advantages of, assure the highest
degree of safety in, and foster sound economic conditions in, such
transportation, and to improve the relations between, and coordi-
nate transportation by, air carriers;
(c) The promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient service
by carriers at reasonable charges, without unjust discriminations, un-
due preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive competitive
practices;
(d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound de-
velopment of an air-transportation system properly adapted to the
needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States
(e) The regulation of air commerce in such manner as to best pro-
mote its development and safety; and
(0 The encouragement and development of civil aeronautics.
Id. (emphasis added).
, Id,
Beane, supra note 31, at 1002.
,5 CAB Act, supra note 30 at § 303, 52 Stat. at 986 (codified as amended at 49
U.S.C. app. § 1349(a)). "Air navigation facility" and "landing area" were defined
as follows in section 1 of the CAB Act:
"Air navigation facility" means any facility used in, available for use in,
or designed for use in, aid of air navigation, including landing areas,
lights, any apparatus or equipment for disseminating weather infor-
mation, for signaling, for radio-directional finding, or for radio or
other electrical communication, and any other structure or mecha-
nism having a similar purpose for guiding or controlling flight in the
air or the landing and take-off of aircraft....
"Landing area" means any locality, either of land or water, includ-
ing airports and intermediate landing fields, which is used, or in-
tended to be used,for the landing and take.offofaircrafl, whether or not
facilities are provided for the shelter, servicing, or repair of aircraft,
or for receiving or discharging passengers or cargo.
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that such funds be approved for any landing area or facil-
ity deemed "reasonably necessary" for use in air com-
merce,-6 but limited the CAA's right to grant funds by
stipulating that "[t]here shall be no exclusive right for the
use of any landing area or air navigation facility upon
which Federal funds have been expended. 37  Section
302(a), which addressed the CAA's duty to establish and
maintain civil airways in particular, concluded with similar
language: "No exclusive rights shall be granted for the
use of any civil airway, landing area, or other navigationfacility." 38
In October, 1940, two years after the GAB Act took ef-
fect, Congress appropriated funds for the construction,
improvement and repair of up to two hundred and fifty
public airports.39 Because some of the airports targeted
CAB Act, supra note 30 at § 1, 52 Stat. at 977, 979 (emphasis added).
so CAB Act, supra note 30 at § 303, 52 Stat. at 986. The term "reasonably nec-
essary" was not defined. See id.
37 Id Congress did not indicate what effect the "exclusive right" language was
to have. For a discussion of the Congressional intent behind section 303, see supra
note 30. For discussion of the judicial interpretation given "exclusive right"
before the Pompano Beach decision, see infra notes 73-143 and accompanying text.
For a discussion ofjudical decisions finding that Congress did not intend section
303 of the CAB Act to provide a private cause of action, see infra notes 73-79 and
accompanying text.
CAB Act, supra note 30 at § 302(a), 52 Stat. at 985. The relevant text of
section 302(a) reads as follows:
The Administrator is empowered to designate and establish civil air-
ways and, within the limits of available appropriations made by Con-
gress, (1) to acquire, establish, operate, and maintain along such
airways all necessary air navigation facilities; ... and (4) to provide
necessary facilities and personnel for the regulation and protection
of air traffic moving in air commerce: Provided ..... No exclusive right
shall be granted for the use of any civil airway, landing area or other air navi-
gation facility.
Il (emphasis added). "Civil Airway" was defined in section 1 of the CAB Act to
mean "a path through the navigable air space of the United States, identified by
an area on the surface of the earth, designated or approved by the Administrator
as suitable for interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce." Id at § 1, 52 Stat. at
978. For the definitions of "air navigation facility" and "landing area" as used in
the CAB Act, see supra note 35.
39 First Supplemental Civil Functions Appropriation Act, ch. 780, 54 Stat. 1030,
1039 (1940)[hereinafter Appropriation Act]. The Appropriation Act provided in
pertinent part:
Development of landing areas: For the construction, improvement,
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for funding had outstanding contracts granting exclusive
rights, the Secretary of Commerce asked the U.S. Attor-
ney General to interpret Section 303.40 Specifically, the is-
sue was whether an exclusive right to use an airport for a
particular aeronautical activity constituted an "exclusive
right" as contemplated by the CAB Act.4 1 The Attorney
General responded that, in his view, Congress clearly did
not intend the term "exclusive right" to apply only to the
exclusive use of an airport for all purposes.42 Further he
and repair of not to exceed two hundred and fifty public airports and
other public landing areas in the United States and its territories and
possessions, determined by the administrator ... to be necessary for
national defense, including area essential for safe approaches and
including the acquisition of land ....Id.
40 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 71, 72 (1941).
41 Id. After reproducing the text of section 303 of the CAB Act (currently codi-
fied as amended at 49 U.S.C. app. § 1349(a) (1982)), the Attorney General began
his opinion as follows:
The last sentence of this section declares that "there shall be no ex-
clusive right for the use of any landing area or air navigation facility
upon which Federal funds have been expended." Funds for the con-
struction, improvement and repair of not to exceed 250 "public air-
ports and other public landing areas" have been appropriated ....
The Acting Secretary [of Commerce] states that these funds are be-
ing expended, by the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics under the
[CAB Act] and that some airports which he desires to develop in his
current program have "outstanding contracts and leases granting
exclusive rights" to conduct at those airports particular "aeronauti-
cal activities, such as air carriers, charter operators and flying
schools." It further appears that similar contracts and leases have
also been found at airports subject to the provisions of section 303
upon which other Federal funds have been expended, or are being
expended. The question which the administrator is required to de-
termine and upon which my advice is desired is whether an exclusive
right to use an airport for a particular aeronautical activity, such as an air
carrier, is an "exclusive right for the use of any landing area" within the mean-
ing of section 303.
Id at 72 (emphasis added).
42 Id. at 72-73. The Attorney General stated:
It seems very doubtful that the term "exclusive right for the use of
any landing area" was intended to apply only to the use of an airport
for all aeronautical purposes or to the total of all the aeronautical
uses to which it is or may be devoted. Under such a construction the
grant to one person of the exclusive right to use an airport for air
carrier service would be permissible as long as another person or
other persons used or were authorized to use it for other aeronauti-
cal activities. But this construction would give a monopoly at the
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felt that it was "clear" that the term "exclusive right" as
used in section 303 was intended to describe a "[p]ower
privilege, or other right excluding or debarring another
or others from enjoying or exercising a like power, privi-
lege, or right."'43 The Attorney General noted finally that
the "mini-monopolies" that would develop as a result of a
narrow interpretation of section 303 would contravene
what he saw as an explicit Congressional mandate: to pro-
hibit monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade,
and to promote and encourage competition in civil
aeronautics.44
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (Aviation Act)45 ex-
tensively modified and reenacted the earlier CAB Act.46
Section 303 was incorporated into the Aviation Act with-
out change as section 408. The legislative history of the
Aviation Act indicates that courts must consider reenact-
ment of unchanged provisions of the CAB Act as a neutral
airport to the air carrier operator and thus would frustrate the pur-
pose of the limitation upon the use of Federal funds. I find nothing
in the language of the statute or its history requiring such a con-
struction. The provision is clearly applicable to any right for the use of a
landing area or an airport in civil aeronautics which is exclusive in character.
Id (emphasis added).
4s Id. at 72. This definition of "exclusive right" was adopted by the FAA in an
advisory circular it published in 1972. See infra notes 58-68 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the advisory circular. The Attorney General's definition
was also quoted in Niswonger v. American Aviation, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 763 (E.D.
Tenn. 1975) (see infra notes 133-143 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Niswonger) and City of Pompano Beach v. FAA, 774 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1985) (see
infra notes 150-153 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Attorney Gen-
eral's opinion as used in Pompano Beach).
4 40 Op. Att'y Gen. at 72.
This meaning is confirmed by the legislative history which shows
that the purpose of the provision is to prohibit monopolies and com-
binations in restraint of trade or commerce and to promote and en-
courage competition in civil aeronautics in accordance with the
policy of the act (sec.2). Cong. Rec., v. 83, pp. 6729, 6730. See, also,
section 302(a) of the statute ....
Id For the relevant text of section 302(a) of the CAB Act, see supra note 38.
45 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 308(a), 72 Stat. 731
(codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542, 1349(a) (1982)) [hereinafter
Aviation Act].
-6 Pompano Beach, 774 F.2d at 1531, 1541. See generally Rider, A Chronological
Listing of Legislation Affecting Civil Aviation, 1938 - 1980, 47 J. AIR L. & CoM. 257
(1982) (background information on the Aviation Act).
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factor in any subsequent questions of interpretation.47
Further, the legislative history shows that the drafters did
not intend to adopt or reject prior judicial decisions or
administrative interpretations such as the 1941 Attorney
General's Opinion.48
The Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970 (De-
velopment Act)49 again changed the legislative framework
governing the aviation industry. A burgeoning economy
and growing U. S. population necessitated increased fed-
eral funding for the development and modernization of
airports and related facilities.5 0 Section 18 of the Devel-
opment Act, codified first at section 1718, then, after pas-
sage of the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of
1982,5 t superceded by section 2210, lists several require-
47 Aviation Act, supra note 45, 72 Stat. at 735. In the published legislative his-
tory of the Aviation Act, Congress included a section entitled "Effect of Repeals
and Reenactment." The section stated:
The reenactment of provisions which are now in effect should be
considered... as an absolute neutralfactor in any question of interpre-
tation which may arise in the future .... From the standpoint of the
continuity of the provisions of law involved in this legislation, inso-
far as they are not changed from the provisions of law being re-
pealed, it is intended that the reenactment of such provisions shall
be considered to have the same effect as though the new act were
amending the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 to "read as follows."
Id. (emphasis added).
48 Id. "In proposing this legislation it is not the intention of the committee to
either adopt or reject administrative interpretations or practices, or judicial deci-
sions under present law." Id
4 Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-258, 84 Stat.
219 [hereinafter Development Act].
50 Sellfors v. United States, 697 F.2d 1362, 1366 (lth Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
468 U.S. 1204 (1984) (holding that the Development Act does not create a statu-
tory duty on the part of the United States to protect third parties using federally
funded airports). In Selifors, the Eleventh Circuit stated:
The [Development Act] was passed for the principal purpose of pro-
viding "for the expansion and improvement of the nation's airport
and airway system" ..... This was necessitated by the burgeoning
United States economy and population which suffered from the lack
of a national system of adequate airport facilities. Neither the legis-
lative history nor the ADA itself reflects any congressional intent
that the Act create duties on the part of the federal government ow-
ing to private individuals using sponsored airport facilities.
Id. at 1366 (citation omitted).
-1 49 U.S.C. § 1718 (1982), superceded by Airport and Airway Improvement Act
of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 523(a), 96 Stat. 695 (1982) (codified at 49 U.S.C.
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ments to be performed as a condition precedent to ap-
proval of airport development projects.52  The first
requires that before an airport can be eligible for public
funding, it must "be available for public use on fair and
reasonable terms and without unjust discrimination
... ."-53 The second requirement, added in 1982, mirrors
the "exclusive right" language of section 1349(a) almost
completely." Although Congress designed sections 1718
and 2210 to regulate the development, as opposed to the
app. § 2210 (1982)). Section 1718 was originally enacted as section 11 of the
Federal Airport Act of 1946, ch. 251, 60 Stat. 170, which was repealed by section
52(a) of the Development Act; see supra note 49.
52 49 U.S.C. app. § 2210(a)(I)-(13) (1982). Section 2210 lists thirteen require-
ments that must be met before the Secretary of Transportation (the successor to
the Civil Aeronautics Authority and the Administrator of the FAA) can approve an
airport development project. The requirements most important to a discussion of
section 1349(a) are reproduced at infra notes 53 and 54.
s 49 U.S.C. app. § 2210(a)(1) (1982). Section 2210(a)(1) states:
As a condition precedent to approval of an airport development pro-
ject... the Secretary shall receive assurances, in writing,... that -
(1) the airport to which the project relates will be available for public
use on fair and reasonable terms and without unjust discrimination, includ-
ing the requirement that (A) each air carrier using such airport...
shall be subject to such nondiscriminatory and substantially compa-
rable rates, . . . and ... rules ... as are applicable to all such air
carriers which make similar use of such airport.., and (B) eachfixed-
based operator at any airport shall be subject to the same rates... as are
uniformly applicable to all other fixed-based operators making the
same or similar use of such airport... and (C) each air carrier using
such airport shall have the right to service itself or to use any fixed-
based operator that is authorized by the airport or permitted by the
airport to serve any air carrier at such airport.
Id (emphasis added).
49 U.S.C. app. § 2210(a)(2) (1982). Section 2210(a)(2) provides:
There will be no exclusive right for the use of an airport by any per-
son providing, or intending to provide, aeronautical services to the
public. For purposes of this paragraph, the providing of services at an
airport by a single fixed.based operator shall not be construed as an ecclusive
right if it would be unreasonably costly, burdensome or impractical for more
than one fixed-based operator to provide such services, and if allowing more
than one fixed-based operator to provide such services would re-
quire the reduction of space leased pursuant to an existing agree-
ment between such single fixed-based operator and such airport.
Id. (emphasis added). Note that the second sentence is virtually identical to the
last sentence of section 1349(a). Both were added in 1982 by the Airport and
Airway Improvement Act of 1982, supra note 51. See supra note 29 for the revelant
text of section 1349(a).
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operation, of airports, 55 at least one party denied access to
airport space has claimed alleged discriminatory conduct
to violate section 1718 (now section 2210) as well as sec-
tion 1349(a).56 In this respect, sections 1718 and 2210, as
well as the judicial decisions interpreting them,57 may
serve as precedent for future interpretations of section
1349(a).
In 1972, the Federal Aviation Administration issued an
advisory circular formulating its interpretation of section
-- Sellfors, 697 F.2d at 1366. "The purpose of the Act is to provide federal funds
for use in developing and modernizing airports and related facilities in conjunc-
tion with a national transportation policy and other national concerns of efficient
and non-discriminatory use of such monies. It was not intended to regulate operations
of airports." Id. (emphasis added).
56 Dallas v. Southwest Airlines Co., 371 F. Supp. 1015 (N.D. Tex.), affid, 494
F.2d 773 (5th Cir.), cert. denied., 419 U.S. 1079 (1973). In Southwest Airlines, both
the plaintiffs and defendant relied upon sections 1718 (now section 2210) and
1349(a). The plaintiffs, the cities of Dallas and Fort Worth, Texas, were in the
process of moving all interstate air service from their municipal airports (Love
Field in Dallas and Greater Southwest International in Fort Worth) to the new
Dallas-Fort Worth Regional Airport. Southwest Airlines was the only purely in-
trastate air carrier operating in the Dallas-Fort Worth area at the time of the
move. It wished to remain at Love Field where the interstate air carriers were
allowed to continue their intrastate commuter services. Id at 1019. The cities
sought a declaratory judgment that they had the right under federal law (includ-
ing sections 1718 and 1349(a)) to exclude Southwest from Love Field after the
opening of the new regional airport. Id Southwest counterclaimed for a declara-
tion of its right under federal law (including sections 1718 and 1349(a)) to remain
at Love Field, and for an injunction to protect that right. Id The plaintiffs argued
that since both Love Field and the regional airport had received federal funds from
federal aid programs, the cities were required to exclude Southwest from Love
Field in order to not unjustly discriminate against the interstate air carriers who
had been relocated to the regional airport. Id at 1023. The court ultimately held
in favor of Southwest, stating: "On the facts herein, the Court must conclude that
a prima facie case of 'unjust discrimination' and of te illegal grant of an 'exclu-
sive right' has been established and that plaintiffs' purported justifications there-
for are inadequate." Id. at 1030; see infra notes 93-132 for a discussion of the
holding in Southwest Airlines; see also infra notes 158-160 for a discussion of the use
of Southwest Airlines in Pompano Beach; see infra note 107 for a discussion of how the
court in Southwest Airlines disposed of the plaintiffs' complaint.
5, At the present, section 1718 has only been interpreted by one major case:
Southwest Airlines, 371 F. Supp. at 1015; see supra note 56 for a discussion of section
1718 as used in Southwest Airlines. Section 2210, the successor to section 1718, has
not yet been judicially interpreted, although the Eleventh Circuit has held that it
does not create a private cause of action. Arrow Airways, Inc. v. Dade County,
749 F.2d 1489 (11th Cir. 1985). For a discussion of the cases holding that section
1349(a) also does not create a private cause of action, see infra notes 73-79 and
accompanying text.
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1349(a).58 Since the FAA is responsible for ensuring com-
pliance with the Federal Aviation Act,59 and section
1349(a) is a "statute committed to the FAA for its admin-
istration,"6 0 courts view the FAA's interpretations of the
Federal Aviation Act as highly persuasive authority.61 A
few of the courts that have interpreted section 1349(a)
have specifically relied on this advisory circular. 2 In the
circular, an "exclusive right" is defined as "[a] power,
privilege, or other right excluding or debarring another
from enjoying or exercising a like power, privilege, or
right. ' 63 Further, an "exclusive right" can be conferred,
according to the circular, by express agreement, imposi-
tion of unreasonable standards or requirements, or any
other means.64 The circular, therefore, gives the term
FAA Advisory Circular No. 150/5190-2A (April 4, 1972), relevant sections re-
printed in Alphin v. Henson, 392 F. Supp. 813, 832-33 (D. Md. 1975), affd, 538
F.2d 85 (4th Cir.), modified on other grounds, 552 F.2d 1033 (4th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1977).
"Pompano Beach, 774 F.2d at 1541.
eoId.
61 Three cases indicate that the advisory circular is a significant statement of
FAA policy. See, e.g., Alphin, 392 F. Supp. at 832 ("FAA has issued policy state-
ments and advisory circulars from time to time. The seven page Advisory Circular
dated 4 April 72 contained the following.... ."); Niswonger, 411 F. Supp. at 767
("Advisory Circular no. 150/5190-2A of April 4, 1972 from the Department of
Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration provides insight into that
agency's interpretation of the prohibition of exclusive rights at airports.").
62 See generally supra note 61.
03 Alphin, 392 F. Supp. at 832. This definition of "exclusive right" is taken ver-
batim from the Attorney General's opinion given to the Secretary of Commerce in
1941 and interpreting section 303 of the CAB Act. 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 72 (1941).
See supra notes 39-44 for a discussion of the 1941 Attorney General's opinion.
, Alphin, 392 F. Supp. at 832. The circular states:
An exclusive right may be conferred either by express agreement, by
imposition of unreasonable standards or requirements, or by any
other means. Such a right conferred on one or more parties but
excluding others from enjoying or exercising a similar right or rights
would be an exclusive right.
7. POLICY. The grant of an exclusive right for the conduct of
any aeronautical activity, on an airport on which Federal funds have
been expended, is regarded as contrary to the requirement of appli-
cable laws, whether such exclusive right results from an express
agreement, from the imposition of unreasonable standards or re-
quirements, or by any other means .... The application of any un-
reasonable requirement, or standard not relevant to the proposed
activity, or any requirement that is applied in a disciriminatoy manner shall
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"exclusive right" an extremely broad definition. Before
issuance of the circular it is doubtful that anything but ex-
press grants of exclusive right could violate section
1349(a).65 Finally, the circular stresses that the presence
at an airport of only one enterprise conducting aeronauti-
cal activities is not conclusive evidence of the grant of an
exclusive right.8 The mere absence of competing activity
is not in itself a violation of section 1349(a) if the airport
authorities did not intend, or take positive action, to ex-
be considered a constructive grant of an exclusive right contrary to applica-
ble law and provisions of agency policy.
Id. at 832-33 (emphasis added). The 1972 Advisory Circular marked the first time
section 1349(a) was interpreted such that it would be violated in the absence of an
eapress grant of exclusive right. The 1941 Attorney General's opinion focused
solely on whether "exclusive right" meant merely the right to exclusively use an
airport for all aeronautical purposes. See supra notes 39-44 for a discussion of the
Attorney General's opinion. Although the Attorney General gave a broad inter-
pretation to section 1349(a), finding that an exclusive right to operate or use a
particular aeronautical activity constitutes an "exclusive right" within the meaning
of the statute, there was no question that the grants at issue had been express.
See, eg., 40 Op. Att'y Gen., supra note 41, at 72. ("The Acting Secretary states that
... some airports which he desires to develop in his current program have 'out-
standing contracts and leases granting exclusive rights'. ... ").
The importance of the FAA's expansion of the legal meaning of "exclusive
right" cannot be over emphasized. To date, only two cases have found implied
grants of exclusive rights resulting from discriminatory conduct and/or the impo-
sition of unreasonable standards. Those cases are Southwest Airlines, see infra notes
93-132, and Pompano Beach, see supra notes 11-29; see also infra notes 144-216. Both
cases, and Pompano Beach in particular, could provide the impetus for an even
broader expansion of section 1349(a). See infra notes 182-216 for a discussion of
the practical implications of the Pompano Beach decision.
65 See supra note 64 for a discussion of the circular's broad interpretation of
"exclusive right."
Alphin, 392 F. Supp. at 832. The relevant section of the circular states:
A. Single Activity. The presence on an airport of only one enterprise
conducting aeronautical activities does not necessarily mean that an
exclusive right has been granted. If there is no intent by express
agreement, by the imposition of unreasonable standards, or by any
other means to exclude others, the absence of a competing activity is
not a violation of this policy. This sort of situation frequently arises
where the market potential is insufficient to attract additional aero-
nautical activities. So long as the opportunity to engage in an aero-
nautical activity is available to those who meet reasonable and
relevant standards, the fact that only one enterprise takes advantage
of the opportunity does not constitute a grant of an exclusive right.
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lude others.6 Apart from the legal ramifications of vio-
lating section 1349(a), the FAA felt that adherence to
section 1349(a) enhances the usefulness of an airport and
allows the public to enjoy the benefits of competitive
enterprise.68
Overall, the legislative and administrative background
of section 1349(a) suggests that the term "exclusive
right" was intended to be broadly construed.69 To avoid
violation of section 1349(a), each aeronautical activity at a
federally funded airport must be open to widespread
competition.7 0 The FAA has indicated that the "grant" of
an exclusive right need not be express in order to consti-
67 Id at 833. The circular states:
b. Space Limitations. The leasing ofall available airport land or facili-
ties suitable for aeronautical activities to a single enterprise will be
construed as evidence of an intent to exclude others. Thispresumption
will not apply if it can be reasonably demonstrated that the total space leased is
presently required and will be immediately used to conduct the planned activity.
The amount of space leased to a single enterprise should be limited
to that for which it can dearly demonstrate an actual, existing need.
If additional space becomes necessary at a later date, it must be
made available, not only to an incumbent enterprise, but at the same
time to all qualified proponents or bidders. The advance grant of op-
tions or preferences on future sites to a single incumbent is evidence of an intent
to grant an exclusive right. On the other hand, nothing in this policy
should be construed as limiting the expansion of a single enterprise
when it needs additional space, even though it may ultimately reach
complete occupancy of all space available.
Id (emphasis added).
88 Id. at 832. The exact language states:
The agency considers that the existence of an exclusive right to con-
duct any aeronautical activity limits the usefulness of an airport and
deprives the using public of the benefits of competitive enterprise.
Apart from legal considerations, the agency believes it clearly inap-
propriate to apply Federal funds to improvement of an airport
where full realization of the benefits would be restricted by the exer-
cise of an exclusive right to engage in aeronautical activities.
Id.
Go Since the FAA published its 1972 Advisory Circular, see supra notes 58-68, the
legal interpretation of section 1349(a) has been expanded to proscribe not only
express grants of exclusive right to operate at federally funded airports, but implied
grants as well. The implied grant arises from the imposition of unreasonable
standards or requirements or by any other means. See supra note 64 for a discussion
of implied grants.
70 See generally 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 71, supra notes 39-44 for pronouncements sup-
porting this proposition; supra notes 51-57 for discussion of the language of sec-
tion 18 of the Development Act (currently codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. app.
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tute a violation of section 1349(a). 71 The imposition of
unreasonable standards or any other discriminatory ac-
tion toward a given lessee could be sufficient.72
B. Case Law Interpretation of Section 1349(a)
1. No Private Cause of Action under Section 1349(a)
As stated above, the administrative history of section
1349(a) suggests that it was intended to be broadly con-
strued.7 3 Even so, it has not been interpreted to provide a
private cause of action, 4 and its usefulness to potential
plaintiffs is, therefore, limited.7 5 Although at least three
courts have applied section 1349(a)'s "exclusive right"
prohibition in private actions, only one explicitly ad-
dressed the issue.76 Further, all three antedated Cort v.
§ 2210 (1982)); supra notes 58-68 for a discussion of the FAA's 1972 Advisory
Circular.
71 See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the
FAA's 1972 Advisory Circular broadened the interpretation of "exclusive right."
72 Id.
73 See supra note 69 and accompanying text. In Aircraft Owners & Pilots Ass'n v.
Port Auth., 305 F. Supp. 93, 105 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), District Judge Dooling stated
that the legislative history of section 1349(a) suggests that it was to be "narrowly
construed" - that the type of exclusive right forbidden was "one of the sort nox-
ious to the anti-trust laws." Id. It should be noted, however, that not only did
Judge Dooling find section 1349(a) applicable in a fact situation far removed from
the type involved in antitrust actions, see infra notes 82-92 for a discussion of the
facts of Aircraft Owners, but he also wrote his opinion three years before the FAA
published its expansive definition of "exclusive right." See supra notes 58-68 for a
discussion of the 1972 advisory circular.
74 See, e.g., Guthrie v. Genesee County, 494 F. Supp. 950, 960 (W.D.N.Y.
1980)("[N]o private remedy exists under 49 U.S.C. § 1349(a) and... defendants'
motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claim under that section should be granted."); Hill
Aircraft & Leasing Corp. v. Fulton County, 561 F. Supp. 667, 673-74 (N.D. Ga.
1982) ("The case against implication of a private cause of action under 49 U.S.C.
§ 1349 is ... strong .... The court.., holds that no individual right of action
under this statute may be implied in this case.").
73 Its usefulness is limited because without a private cause of action, all a poten-
tial plaintiff can do is file a complaint with the FAA.
70 The three cases in which private plaintiffs were allowed to pursue causes of
action based on section 1349(a) are Aircraft Owners & Pilots Ass'n v. Port Auth.,
305 F. Supp. 93 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), see infra notes 82-92 for a discussion of Aircraft
Owners; Continental Bus System, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 386 F. Supp. 359 (N.D.
Tex. 1974); and Niswonger v. American Aviation, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 769 (E.D.
Tenn. 1975), aff'd, 529 F.2d 526 (6th Cir. 1976), see infra notes 133-143 for a dis-
cussion of Niswonger. Niswonger was the only one of the three that explicitly ad-
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Ash," a 1978 Supreme Court decision establishing a four-
prong "implied" cause of action test. Since the Cort deci-
sion, three additional cases have applied the Cort factors
to section 1349(a), 78 and all three have expressly deter-
mined that Congress did not intend for section 1349(a) to
confer a private cause of action.79
2. Judicial Interpretation of "Exclusive Right"
Since private antitrust actions have been pursued
against defendants engaging in the type of activity prohib-
ited by section 1349(a),80 the grant of "exclusive right"
dressed whether a private cause of action could be implied under section 1349(a).
In deciding that it could, the court stated:
American also contends that the allegations herein fall within the
primary jurisdiction of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
and that the plaintiff must first exhaust the administrative remedies
afforded .... "[I]t is clear that a violation of the provisions of the
Federal Aviation Act or the regulations or rules issued pursuant
thereto may give rise to a private federal right of action maintainable
by those injured by the violation. Judge Frank, speaking for the
court in Fitzgerald, specifically rejected the argument raised by (the
defendants) that 'the sole non-criminal federal remedy for a viola-
tion of any provisions of the Act is to be found in... a complaint to
the Civil Aeronautics Board (or administrator) which must investi-
gate the complaint and, if the facts warrant, must issue an order
compelling compliance with the violated provisions of the Act.'
Judge Frank stated: 'We cannot agree. As such an order must look
to the fiture, obviously it cannot afford redress to one harmed by a
violation (of a section of the Act) .. .' Plaintiffs cannot be relegated
to administrative remedies when these remedies do not exist ......
Niswonger, 411 F. Supp. at 768 (quoting Town of East Haven v. Eastern Airlines,
Inc., 282 F. Supp. 507 (D.C. Conn. 1968) (citation omitted)).
" 422 U.S. 66 (1975). Under Cort, the following factors are analyzed in order
to determine whether a private cause of action should be implied in a statute: (1)
whether the statute was enacted for the particular benefit of a class to which Plain-
tiff belongs, (2) whether or not the legislative history explicitly or implicitly cre-
ates or denies a private right of action, and (3) whether a private remedy is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the section. Guthrie, 494 F. Supp. at 959;
HilAircrafl, 561 F. Supp. at 672.
78 The three post-Cont cases holding that no private cause of action can be im-
plied from section 1349(a) are Guthrie, 494 F. Supp. at 950; Hill Aircraft, 561 F.
Supp. at 667; and Pumpkin Air, Inc. v. City of Addison, 608 F. Supp. 787 (D.C.
Tex. 1985).
79 See generally supra note 78.
o For cases in which antitrust causes of action were pursued based on conduct
similar to that involved in section 1349(a) cases, see Pinehurst Airlines, Inc. v.
Resort Air Serv., Inc., 476 F. Supp. 543 (M.D.N.C. 1979); Alphin, 392 F. Supp. at
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forbidden by section 1349(a) was originally conceptual-
ized as conduct "noxious to the antitrust laws.""' How-
ever, the District Court for the Eastern District of New
York in Aircraft Owners & Pilots Ass'n v. Port Auth.,82 deter-
mined that section 1349(a) should not be "confined to in-
stances of manifest antitrust violation" alone. 3
In Aircraft Owners, an association of general aviators
sought to enjoin the imposition of "take-off' fees by the
Port Authority of New York.8 4 The Port Authority im-
posed the fee on aircraft operating with a seating capacity
of less than twenty-five during certain peak traffic hours.85
The Port Authority developed the fee in order to relieve
congestion and to achieve maximum operating efficiency
at three major airports. 88 Since section 1304 of the Fed-
eral Aviation Act declares a "public right of freedom of
transit through the navigable airspace of the United
States,87 the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association be-
lieved the fee to be openly discriminatory.8 8 Therefore, it
claimed, the fee violated several provisions of federal law,
813; National Aviation Trades Ass'n v. CAB, 420 F.2d 209 (D.C. Cir. 1969); E. W.
Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 362 F.2d 52 (1st Cir. 1966).
at Pompano Beach, 774 F.2d at 1542 (quoting Aircraft Owners & Pilots Ass'n v.
Port Auth., 305 F. Supp. 93, 105 (E.D.N.Y. 1969)).
a2 305 F. Supp. 93 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
Id. at 105.
Id. at 96. Although termed a "take-off" fee, the fee was exacted during pre-
scribed periods from airplanes landing as well as airplanes "taking off." Id.
, Id. The fee also did not apply to helicopters or air taxis.
so Id. at 98. The airports areJohn F. Kennedy International Airport, LaGuardia
Airport, and Newark Airport. Id. at 97. These three airports "accommodate sub-
stantially all of the area's commercial airline traffic." Id
The Port Authority of New York was created by an interstate compact between
New Jersey and New York. Id at 96. Under the compact the Port Authority is
authorized to maintain and operate all facilities "necessary, convenient or desira-
ble for the landings, taking off, accommodation, and servicing of aircraft ." and to
determine "all details of financing, construction, leasing, charges, rates, tolls, con-
tracts, and the operation of air terminals owned or controlled ." Id
87 49 U.S.C. app. § 1304 (1982); see also Aircraft Owners, 305 F. Supp. at 101
(interpreting section 1304 as the "most basic of all federal provisions").
88 Aircraft Owners, 305 F. Supp. at 101. In making this argument, the association
apparently contended that under federal law, each aircraft - whether it contained
ten seats or two hundred - deserved equal access to runways at federally funded
airports. However, as the court explicitly noted, "[i]f it be true that all persons
have equal rights of access to the navigable air space, then it is not undifferenti-
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including section 1349(a).89 The court did not consider
the dispute "so remote from the class of competitive re-
straints" envisioned by section 1349(a) that the statute
would not apply.90 Nevertheless, the court found that no
exclusive right had been granted through the use of the
fee.91 Preferential landing times and the imposition of
fees during peak traffic hours were deemed to be accepta-
ble ways to control safety and efficiency, and compatible
with every person's interest in freedom of access to navi-
gable airways. 92
Decided four years after Aircraft Owners, City of Dallas v.
Southwest Airlines Co. 93 marked the first time a court held an
airport policy to be unjustly discriminatory and tanta-
mount to the grant of an exclusive right.9 4 Southwest Air-
lines, a case decided by the District Court for the Northern
District of Texas and affirmed by the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals,9" relied heavily on the Attorney General's
1941 interpretation of section 30396 and the Aircraft Own-
ated aircraft by count that must be treated equally in landing approach and take-
off." Id. at 106 (emphasis added).
8 Id. at 101. See supra note 29 for the relevant text of section 1349(a). The
association cited two other federal statutes in addition to section 1349(a): 49
U.S.C. § 1304, see supra text accompanying note 87 for the relevant text of section
1304, and 49 U.S.C. § 1110 (1982)(providing that as a condition precedent to
approval of an airport project, the (FAA) Administrator "shall receive assurances
... that ... the airport to which the project relates will be available for public use
on fair and reasonable terms and without unjust discrimination ...
Aircraft Ownmers, 305 F. Supp. at 105.
o' See id. at 105-09.
Id. at 106. "Considerations of safety and of efficient utilization of the air
space are both valid grounds upon which to establish preferential assignments of
landing and take-off times ... ." Id
0- 371 F. Supp. 1015 (N.D. Tex. 1973), aff'd, 494 F.2d 773 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1079 (1974). See infra text accompanying notes 158-160 for the Eleventh
Circuit's interpretation and application of Southwest Airlines in Pompano Beach.
- Southwest Airlines, 371 F. Supp. at 1032; cf. supra text accompanying notes 82.
93 and the discussion of Aircraft Owners, a prior case finding no exclusive right to
have been granted.
"City of Dallas v. Southwest Airlines Co., 494 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1974).
40 Op. Att'y Gen. 71 (1941), see supra text accompanying notes 39-44 for a
discussion of the Attorney General's interpretation of section 1349(a)'s "exclusive
right."
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ers97 case in reaching its decision.98
In Southwest Airlines, the cities of Dallas and Fort Worth
had been in the process of relocating all interstate air ser-
vice 99 to their new Regional Airport.100 The cities were
concerned that competitive activity at each existing mu-
nicipal airport could jeopardize their ability to operate the
new Regional Airport and retire its debt.101 As a result,
the cities issued a joint ordinance limiting the type of air
activity that could continue at the municipal airports. 02
Southwest Airlines, which had been conducting a wholly
intrastate commuter airline service out of Love Field in
Dallas, was excluded by the ordinance.'03 Because of the
restrictive terms of the ordinance, Southwest Airlines was
the only intrastate airline service which could not remain
at Love. Field. 10 4 The large commercial interstate airlines
97 305 F. Supp. 93 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); see supra text accompanying notes 82-92 for
a discussion of Aircraft Owners.
00 Southwest Airlines, 371 F. Supp. at 1030. The court distinguished the holding
in Aircraft Owners (which the court called Port Authority) on the grounds that the
Dallas/Fort Worth region would not foreseeably suffer the "severe shortage of
Airport capacity" which justified the preferences granted in Aircraft Owners. Ia
- In 1964, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) entered an interim order giving
Dallas and Fort Worth 180 days in which to designate a single airport through
which all CAB-regulated carriers would serve the area. Southwest Airlines, 371 F.
Supp. at 1020. Instead of designating Love Field, in Dallas, or Greater Southwest
International Airport, in Fort Worth, the cities agreed to construct and operate a
new regional airport to be located mid-way between the two. Id. Thus, the relo-
cation of all interstate air service to the regional airport was instigated by the
CAB. Id.
a- Id. at 1019.
I at 1020.
,'IdA The ordinance, tided the 1968 Regional Airport Concurrent Bond Ordi-
nance, authorized the issuance of revenue bonds and provided, among other
things, that the cities "shall take such steps as may be necessary, appropriate and
legally permissible... to provide for the orderly, efficient and effective phase-out
... of any and all Certificated Air Carrier Services, and to transfer such activities
to the Regional Airport...." Id.
lo, Id. at 1021. Southwest was never officially ordered to move from Love Field
per se, but the cities did reject a "Petition for Exemption" submitted by Southwest,
contending that CAB rulings deprived them of jurisdiction to consider the re-
quest. Id. The cities then filed this lawsuit seeking a declaration of their right to
exclude Southwest from Love Field. Id at 1019; see infra text accompanying notes
107-132 for a discussion of the court's decision in Southwest Airlines.
,-4 By the terms of the ordinance, "air taxis," unscheduled cargo flights, gen-
eral aviation (i.e., private and corporate aircraft), and unscheduled charter flights
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were allowed to continue their intrastate commuter serv-
ices, all charter flights could stay, and Southwest's major
competitors, small "air taxi" lines,105 were exempt from
the move as well. 10 6
When Southwest petitioned Dallas and Fort Worth for
an exemption from the ordinance, the cities sought a dec-
laration that they had the right under federal and state law
to exclude Southwest from Love Field once the Regional
Airport opened.10 7 The court held that the cities had un-justly discriminated against Southwest and had thereby
granted an exclusive right to the carriers allowed to re-
main at Love Field.108
The district court gave four reasons for its decision.
were exempted from the move to the regional airport. The intrastate commuter
services provided by the interstate, CAB-authorized air carriers were exempted as
well. As a result, Southwest was the only intrastate air carrier affected by the ordi-
nance. Southwest Airlines, 371 F. Supp. at 1027.
105 Although the term "air taxi" was never defined by the district court in its
opinion, the district court noted that "air taxi" operators carry passengers for hire
on a scheduled basis, are certified for intrastate travel by the Texas Aeronautics
Commission (TAC), and are competitors of Southwest Airlines. Id. See infa note
111 for a description of the TAC's regulatory power.
- Southwest Airlines, 371 F. Supp. at 1027-28.
,-, Id at 1019. In 1964, the CAB entered an interim order directing Dallas and
Fort Worth to designate one specific airport through which all interstate air car-
rier service to the area would be provided. It indicated that if the cities could not
agree which airport to so designate, the CAB would "amend the certificates of the
interstate air carriers under its jurisdiction so as to cause them to serve either Love
Field or Fort Worth's (Greater Southwest International Airport)." Id at 1019-20(emphasis added). In their complaint, the cities argued that they were required by
the CAB's order to move not only all interstate air service to the new regional
airport, but Southwest's wholly intrastate service as well. Id at 1021. A novel
theory it advanced to support this argument was that since Love Field and the
regional airport had both received Federal funding, the cities were required to ex-
clude Southwest from Love Field in order to avoid unjustly discriminating against
the CAB carriers in violation of section 1349(a). Id at 1023. The court rejected
this argument with the following language:
The federal prohibition against unjust discrimination is designed to
ensure that the airport owner or operator... provides potential users of
the airport with a fair and nondiscriminatory "opportunity" to use
its facilities, provided the user can lawfully do so. If the potential
user cannot, or does not, choose to avail itself of the "opportunity"
to use the airport, the airport operator is obviously not required to
exclude those who can and do choose to use such facilities.
Io Id. at 1030.
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First, it noted that the cities could not claim, as had the
Port Authority of New York in Aircraft Owners,'09 that its
preferential treatment of certain air carriers was in the
public interest." 0 The Texas Aeronautics Commission
(TAG), the state agency charged with the economic regu-
lation of Texas intrastate air carriers, 1 ' had issued South-
west a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity
when Southwest first began operating out of Love
Field." 2 The Certificate authorized Southwest to serve
the Dallas-Fort Worth region through any airport in the
area. 1 3 Southwest, therefore, had the right to operate
out of Love Field and remain there if it chose. Although
the cities had obtained permission from the CAB to limit
CAB-authorized interstate air carriers to the Regional Air-
port, they had not sought similar permission from the
TAC for TAC-authorized intrastate air carriers."14 The
court concluded that "TAC's existing determination that
the public interest requires Southwest to serve Love Field
must.., be deemed conclusive .... "115
too 305 F. Supp. at 93; see supra text accompanying notes 82-92 for a discussion
of Aircraft Owners.
'o Southwest Airlines, 371 F. Supp. at 1030-31; see also Aircraft Owners, 305 F.
Supp. at 105-09 for a general discussion of the public interests supporting the
discriminatory landing fees addressed in that case.
.. Southwest Airlines, 371 F. Supp. at 1019. Although the federal government
has preempted much of the field of civil air regulation, states still have the power
to act so long as there is no conflict with federal law. Texas Aeronautics Comm'n
v. Braniff Airways Inc., 454 S.W.2d 199 (Tex.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970).
Title 3A of the Revised Civil Statutes of the State of Texas establishes and gov-
erns the Texas Aeronautics Commission (TAC). Article 46c-6(3) states:
Air Carriers. (a) The Commission is hereby granted and vested with
the right, power and authority to promulgate and administer eco-
nomic rules and regulations over air carriers .... to the extent that its
rules and regulations do not conflict with fideral rules and legislation concern-
ing functions within the jurisdiction offederal agencies.
TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 46c-6(3) (Vernon 1969)(emphasis added). Note
that Article 46c-6(3) does not distinguish between interstate and intrastate air ser-
vice, and the only limitation on the type of air service to which the TAC's regula-
tory power extends is contained in the last sentence highlighted above.
112 Southwest Airlines, 371 F. Supp. at 1021.
its Id.
14 Id. at 1030-31.
1i Id. at 1031. In reaching this determination, the court stressed that since the
TAC was charged by statute to determine "the public convenience and necessity
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Second, relying again on Aircraft Owners116 as author-
ity, 17 the court stated that the recognized preference for
commercial air traffic must prevail over the cities' un-
stated, yet obvious, desire to exclude Southwest for
purely economic reasons.118 Whereas in Aircraft Owners
mass public transportation was acceptably granted prefer-
ence over general aviation, Dallas and Fort Worth were
doing just the opposite.1 9 The cities were granting ac-
cess to private aircraft, corporate jets, and unscheduled
cargo flights while attempting to exclude the public air
service offered by Southwest.12 0  Instead of maximizing
public access to a public airport supported by federal
funds, the cities were, according to the court, overtly sup-
in the area of intrastate air transportation" and it had issued Southwest a certifi-
cate of public convenience and necessity, and since Dallas and Fort Worth had not
directly challenged the TAC's judgment in issuing the certificate, the TAC's deci-
sion that Southwest should serve Love Field would not be subject to collateral
attack. Id. at 1030-31.
-i See supra text accompanying notes 82-92 for a discussion of Aircraft Owners.
-' The district court relied heavily uponAircraft Owners as a statement of public
policy and as a legal framework for its conclusions in Southwest Airlines. See South-
west Airlines, 371 F. Supp. at 1028-30.
is Southwest Airlines, 371 F. Supp. at 1031. If Southwest remained at Love Field,
the cities were concerned that the resulting decrease in the revenue generated by
the Regional Airport would frustrate their efforts to retire the Regional Airport's
debt. Id at 1025. With respect to this issue the court stated:
Finally, Plaintiffs' apparently contend that if Southwest Airlines is
permitted to remain at Love Field after the opening of the Regional
Airport, the ability of the Regional Airport Board to operate that
Airport and to retire the outstanding debt on the Airport Revenue
Bonds will be jeopardized due to diversion of needed revenue to
Love Field. It is not seriously argued by Plaintiffs that the revenues
from Southwest Airlines' three present aircraft and the passengers
they carry are, in and of themselves, essential to the operation of the
Regional Airport. Instead, Plaintiffs maintain that Southwest's con-
tinued presence at Love Field will, to some extent, induce the CAB
carriers to retain service there (an argument that Southwest has
characterized as the "domino theory") and that the cumulative loss
of revenue from Southwest and these other carriers will have a signif-
icant impact on the financial security of the Regional Airport.
In the opinion of the Court, the evidence demonstrates that Plain-
tiffs have overstated their fears concerning the financial impact upon
the Regional Airport of Southwest's remaining at Love Field ....
Id
"o Id at 1029; see also Aircraft Owners, 305 F. Supp. at 107.
SouthwestAirlines, 371 F. Supp. at 1029.
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pressing competition in order to gain an economic advan-
tage for the Regional Airport. 121 The court found that
this action contradicted the policies underlying section
1349(a). 122
In formulating the third reason why the cities were in
violation of federal law, the court focused on the discrimi-
natory effect the ordinance's classification system would
have on the public.'25 As stated above, Dallas and Fort
Worth allowed air taxis, as well as other air carriers in di-
rect competition with Southwest, to continue their opera-
tions at Love Field. 124 Southwest's presence in the short-
haul market had generated vigorous competition, result-
ing in greatly expanded commuter markets and substan-
tial savings to the traveling public. 125 If the ordinance had
been allowed to operate and Southwest had been forced
to move to the Regional Airport, this positive effect on
market competition would have deteriorated. Conse-
quently, the court deemed the ordinance discriminatory
per se126 based on the anti-competitive effect it had on the
i,' Id. at 1029-30; see supra note 118 and accompanying text for background
information on the economic advantages the cties sought to gain by excluding
Southwest from Love Field.
122 Southwest Airlines, 371 F. Supp. at 1030. For a discussion of section 1349(a),
its history, and the policies behind it, see supra notes 29-72 and accompanying
text.
12 Southwest Airlines, 371 F. Supp. at 1031.
124 See supra note 104 and accompanying text for a discussion of the type of air
traffic exempted from the ordinance.
225 Southwest Airlines, 371 F. Supp. at 1031 n.8. In a footnote the court stated:
The uncontroverted evidence shows that Southwest's presence in
the short-haul market, and particularly at close-in Hobby Airport in
Houston has generated vigorous competition among the various car-
riers on the routes which Southwest serves resulting in a greatly ex-
panded short-haul commuter market and in very substantial savings
to the traveling public.
Id.
Id2 Id. at 1031. The fact that the court deemed the conduct of Dallas and Fort
Worth (i.e., the promulgation of the 1968 Ordinance) discriminatory per se is sig-
nificant. This is a major distinction between Southwest Airlines and Pompano Beach,
see infra text accompanying notes 144-181. Although Southwest Airlines was cited as
precedent for the holding of Pompano Beach, the city's conduct in Pompano Beach
was not found to be discriminatory per se. See infra text accompanying notes 204-
211 for a discussion of this distinction.
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airlines and the public they serve.1 27
Finally, the court found the exclusion of Southwest
from Love Field to be "inherently unjust" because it at-
tempted to remove the one type of passenger service most
needed at a close-in airport. 128  The court emphasized
that removal to an inconvenient airport would most likely
discourage short-haul passengers from using the airways,
and that buses, cars, and trains would become more viable
alternatives.1 29
To summarize, the court in Southwest Airlines interpreted
Aircraft Owners as standing for two propositions: (1) a defi-
nite preference exists for mass transportation over private
aircraft, 30 and (2) the reasonable limitation of a particular
airport use is permissable, whereas the complete exclu-
sion of that use bears a heavy burden of justification.131
The court relied upon both propositions extensively in
order to reach its decision in Southwest Airlines.1 32
One year after Southwest Airlines was decided, the District
Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee declared in
Niswonger v. American Aviation, Inc. 3 that a county's leas-
ing of all of its available airport land or facilities suitable
for aeronautical activities to a single enterprise was evi-
dence of the county's intent to exclude others. 3 4 The
court reasoned further that in order for airports to com-
ply with section 1349(a), they must limit the amount of
127 Southwest Airlines, 371 F. Supp. at 1031.
128 Id.
1- Id. at 1031-32.
- Id at 1028-30 (construing Aircraft Owners, 305 F. Supp. at 106-08).
is, Id at 1029.
132 Id. at 1030-32.
i" 411 F. Supp. 769 (E.D. Tenn. 1975), aJ'd, 529 F.2d 526 (6th Cir. 1976).
' Id. at 770-71. in its memorandum decision the court made ten findings of
fact. One finding stated "[b]y the aforementioned lease indenture of June 16,
1969, the (Tennessee Airport Authority) leased to (American Aviation, Inc.) ex-
clusively all the then available facilities suitable for aeronautical activities and
evinced thereby an intention to exclude therefrom all other generalfixed-base operators." Id. at
770 (emphasis added). Later in the opinion, the court quoted the following lan-
guage from the 1972 FAA Advisory Circular "[Tihe leasing ofall available airport
land or facilities suitable for aeronautical activities to a single enterprise... [is]
... evidence of an intent to exclude others." Id For a discussion of the 1972 FAA
Advisory Circular, see supra notes 58-68 and accompanying text.
1071
1072 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [52
space leased to any single enterprise to an amount for
which the enterprise can demonstrate an actual, existing
need. 1 5
In Niswonger, defendant American Aviation's lease with
the Greeneville-Greene County Airport Authority granted
it the exclusive right to use all ramp and hangar space
available at the Greeneville municipal airport.'-" Plaintiff
Niswonger, doing business as Greeneville Air Service, op-
erated at the airport as a licensed air taxi commercial op-
erator.1 37 Greeneville Air Service applied to the Airport
Authority to become a general fixed-base operator, but
was denied access because the county had leased all ramp
space then existing at the airport to American Aviation. 58
Niswonger filed suit, seeking a declaration that the lease
between the Airport Authority and American Aviation was
void because it illegally granted an exclusive right.15 9
American Aviation contended that section 1349(a) ap-
plied only to actual runways and other areas used in com-
1s- Niswonger, 411 F. Supp. at 771. For example, two findings of fact stated:
8. There is available at the airport space for an additional qualified
general fixed-base operator, and American has been granted by the au-
thority, Greeneville, and the county more area at such airport than Amer-
ican can actually use reasonably in its existing operations.
9. Air Service applied to the authority in September, 1973, to
become an additional general fixed-base operator at the airport.
The authority did not consider such application, because all the ramp
space then existing was lased to American.
It at 770 (emphasis added)(footnotes omitted).
13o Id. at 770.
137 Id. at 769-70.
138 Id. at 770.
,3D Id at 769-70. Although Niswonger filed suit seeking a declaratory judg-
ment, he did not invoke the court's jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgments
Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2210, 2202 (1982). Id. at 765. Instead, he sought to invoke the
court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1337 ("ITihe district courts shall have origi-
nal jurisdiction of any civil action or proceeding arising under any Act of Con-
gress regulating commerce or protecting trade and commerce against restraints
and monopolies.") Id. at 764. The defendants moved the court to dismiss Nis-
wonger's action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id Even though it has
been held that section 1349(a) does not provide a private cause of action the court
held that Niswonger did state a cause of action under section 1349(a) for the pur-
pose of surviving a motion to dismiss. Niswonger, 411 F. Supp. at 767. The court's
rationale is discussed at supra note 76.
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mon by air carriers.1 40 The court, however, relying on the
1941 Attorney General's Opinion, 41 and the FAA's 1972
advisory circular,142 reiterated that section 1349(a) pros-
cribes the grant of an exclusive right for any particular
aeronautical activity and it therefore declared the lease
void.143
II. Ciny OF POMPANO BEACH V. FAA
A. Eleventh Circuit's Interpretation of Section 1349(a)
In City of Pompano Beach v. FAA,1 44 the court began its
discussion of section 1349(a) by recognizing that the FAA
is responsible for ensuring compliance with the Federal
Aviation Act, 45 and consequently, section 1349(a) is a
statute "committed to the FAA for its administration."' 46
Since section 1349(a) provides that "[t]here shall be no
exclusive right for the use of any landing area or air navi-
gation facility upon which federal funds have been ex-
pended,"'147 and the city of Pompano Beach had been the
recipient of federal funds, 48 the court held that the city
was governed by the Act's "exclusive right"
140 Niswonger v. American Aviation, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 763, 765 (E.D. Tenn.
1975) (decision on motion to dismiss).
141 See supra text accompanying notes 40-44 for a discussion of the 1941 Attor-
ney General's opinion.
142 See supra notes 58-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 1972
Advisory Circular.
,,s Niswonger, 411 F. Supp. at 771. Although the memorandum opinion does
not explicitly state that the court relied on the Attorney General's 1941 opinion
and the FAA 1972 Advisory Circular, the relevant language from both is quoted in
the opinion. See id at 770-71; Niswonger, 411 F. Supp. at 766-67 (decision on mo-
tion to dismiss).
14 774 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1985). See supra notes 1-28 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the facts of Pompano Beach.
145 Pompano Beach, 774 F.2d at 1541. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying
text for a brief discussion of the Federal Aviation Act.
14' Pompano Beach, 774 F.2d at 1541.
147 Id (quoting 49 U.S.C. app. § 1349(a)(1982)). See supra note 29 for the com-
plete text of section 1349(a). See supra notes 29-48 for the complete legislative
history of section 1349(a). See supra notes 58-68 for the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration's interpretation of section 1349(a).
14a Pompano Beach, 774 F.2d at 1541. The court stated that "the City of Pom-
pano Beach has been the recipient of federal funds and property for its Air Park
through various federal aid programs... ." Id
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prohibition.14 9
In reviewing the history of section 1349(a), the court
quoted at length from the 1941 Attorney General's Opin-
ion'50 that defined exclusive right as a "power, privilege,
or other right excluding or debarring another or others
from enjoying or exercising a like power, privilege, or
right."'"' It further noted that section 1349(a)'s goal is to
prohibit monopolies and combinations in restraint of
trade and to promote competition, 15 2 and the court noted
that, according to the Attorney General's opinion, any
right to use a landing area or airport which is exclusive in
character is prohibited.158
Although the city of Pompano Beach never expressly
granted the incumbent lessees John and Brian Becker an
exclusive right,15 4 the court emphasized that a city's "im-
position of unreasonable standards or requirements"
alone could cause a federally funded airport to invoke a
section 1349(a) sanction. 58 In a footnote, the court
14 Id. Specifically, the court found the city to be "subject to federal prohibi-
tions against unjust discrimination resulting from the grant of an exclusive right."
Id (emphasis added). The court used the terms "unjust discrimination" and "ex-
clusive right" throughout its opinion, but only the term "exclusive right" is used
explicitly in section 1349(a). See supra note 29 for the text of section 1349(a).
-" See supra text accompanying notes 40-44 for a discussion of the 1941 Attor-
ney General's opinion.
1' Pompano Beach, 774 F.2d at 1541; 40 Op. Att'y Gen. at 72. See supra text ac-
companying notes 40-44 for a general discussion of the 1941 Attorney General's
opinion. See supra note 43 for the text of the opinion containing the above quoted
language.
1 Pompano Beach, 774 F.2d at 1541; see supra note 44 and accompanying text for
a discussion of this goal in the 1941 Attorney General's opinion.
" Pompano Beach, 774 F.2d at 1541; see supra text accompanying notes 40-44 for
a general discussion of the 1941 Attorney General's opinion. See supra note 42 for
the text of the opinion referring to an "exclusive right" as any right to use a land-
ing area which is exclusive in character.
-" See Pompano Beach, 774 F.2d at 1535. See supra note 10 for background infor-
mation on the incumbent lessees, John and Brian Becker, and their operations at
the Air Park.
15' Pompano Beach, 774 F.2d at 1542. The Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) first declared that the imposition of unreasonable standards or require-
ments could invoke a section 1349(a) sanction in its 1972 Advisory Circular. See
supra notes 58-68 for a general discussion of the advisory circular. See supra note
64 for a specific discussion of the imposition of unreasonable standards as a legal
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quoted from the FAA's 1972 advisory circular: 56  "So,
long as the opportunity to engage in an aeronautical activ-
ity is available to those who meet reasonable and relevant
standards, the fact that only one enterprise takes advantage
of the opportunity does not constitute a grant of an exclu-
sive right." 157
The Eleventh Circuit concluded its review of section
1349(a)'s rather skeletal history by mentioning two major
"exclusive right" cases: City of Dallas v. Southwest Airlines
Co. '58 and Niswonger v. American Aviation, Inc. 59 Though
the court did no more than tersely summarize each, it ef-
fectively, but subtly, revealed how each case would con-
tribute to the standard it would apply to the City of
Pompano Beach. The court cited Southwest Airlines for the
proposition that avoiding potentially detrimental effects
on competition does not, in itself, constitute a sufficient
justification for granting exclusive rights.160 In reviewing
Niswonger, the court concluded that an exclusive right ex-
ists if a lessee controls, to the exclusion of others, more
airport property than it reasonably needs or can be ex-
prohibition. See infra notes 182-211 for the practical implications of the use of
unreasonable standards as a legal prohibition.
IM See supra text accompanying notes 58-68 for a discussion of the 1972 FAA
Advisory Circular and its definition of section 1349(a)'s "exclusive right."
1- Pompano Beach, 774 F.2d at 1542 n.13 (emphasis added). See supra notes 66-
67 for a discussion of this language as used in 1972 Advisory Circular.
-s See supra text accompanying notes 93-132 for a discussion of Southwest
Airlines.
-s See supra text accompanying notes 133-143 for a discussion of Niswonger.
-O Pompano Beach, 774 F.2d at 1542. With regards to the holding in Southwest
Airlines, the Eleventh Circuit stated:
In [Southwest Airlines], the district court concluded that a city ordi-
nance governing the phase-out provisions of Love Field near Dallas
that would have allowed continued service at Love Field by certain
types of aircraft but would have required Southwest and other air-
craft in Southwest's classification to move to the new Regional Air-
port constituted unjust discrimination and a grant of an exclusive
right of access to some carriers and not to others. The city's explana-
tion for prohibiting Southwest from continuing its operation at Love
Field was that it wanted to avoid the potential competitive effect on
the regional airport; The district court said this was insufficient justflcation.
Id (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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pected to use. 6 1 The court also noted that both Niswonger
and the present case involved situations where applicants
for fixed base operators' leases had been unreasonably
denied airport access. 162
B. Application of Section 1349(a) to the City of Pompano
Beach
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals based its hold-
ing in Pompano Beach on three key facts: (1) the uniquely
discriminatory effect of the city's "standard" lease provi-
sions on Brettman's ability to compete as an FBO at the
Air Park,16 3 (2) the monopolistic position the incumbent
fixed base operators, the Beckers, enjoyed at the Air
Park,lM and (3) the city's "ulterior motive" in rejecting
Brettman's application, a desire to shield the Beckers' op-
erations from the competition that Brettman's proposed
facility would bring.16
5
"0' Id. With regards to Niswonger, the court stated:
In (Niswonger], a case closely analogous to the case at bar, the district court
held that the public airport authority violated federal law by granting
an exclusive right to an incumbent fixed base operator. In Niswonger,
an applicant for a fixed base operator's lease at the airport was de-
nied access to the airport on the grounds that all available land had
been leased to the incumbent fixed base operators. The court said
that this transaction constituted a violation of federal law, particu-
larly because the lessee, by this device, had acquired control and exclusive use
of more area of the airport than it reasonably needed or could be expected
to use in conducting its business.
kIL (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
12 Id. See the highlighted language quoted at supra note 161.
16, Pompano Beach, 774 F.2d at 1543. See infra notes 166-169 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the uniquely discriminatory effect of the city's conduct
towards Brettman. The city's "standard" lease - which differed in several re-
spects from the leases entered into with the incumbent FBOs - is discussed at
supra notes 3, 8, 19, and 23.
,-4 Pompano Beach, 774 F.2d at 1544. Although there were two incumbent fixed-
base operators at the Air Park when Brettman applied for a lease, the two entities
are owned and operated by a father and son team, John and Brian Becker. See
supra note 10 for a discussion of the Becker's operations at the Air Park. See supra
note 2 for a discussion of the Becker's protests to the Air Park Advisory Board
against approving Brettman's application. See infra notes 170-175 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of Becker's "monopoly" as an exclusive right.
163 Pompano Beach, 774 F.2d at 1544. See infra notes 176-178 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the court's finding that the city desired to shield the Beck-
ers from competition.
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The court noted first that the provisions of the lease of-
fered Brettman were disadvantageous to him on their
face. 166 Brettman had testified that he was an experienced
aviator and businessman, and that he engaged in the busi-
ness of developing aircraft hangar facilities at airports. 16 7
The FAA hearing officer had found that the provisions of
the city's "standard" lease would impose undue hardship
upon Brettman's proposed business operation at the Air
Park and render it noncompetitive with the existing fixed
base operators.168 The Eleventh Circuit held that these
findings, coupled with the finding that the city's delays in
negotiating with Brettman benefited the incumbent les-
sees, could reasonably be construed to amount to an im-
plied grant of an exclusive right in favor of the Beckers. 169
,o Pompano Beach, 774 F.2d at 1543. The court stated:
The City argues that the different provisions in the proposed
Brettman lease are not unjustly discriminatory per se. This is true.
But, based upon the evidence in the record, the hearing officer was
entitled to find that they were unjustly discriminatory. First, the cited
provisions in the lease offered to Bretman are, on theirface, disadvantageous to
Brettman.
Id (emphasis added).
-o Id. The court noted that "Brettman had constructed hangars at airports in
Venice, Daytona Beach, Orlando, and Merritt Island, Florida and was soon to
commence such an operation in Jacksonville." Id, Based on Brettman's experi-
ence, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that it was "reasonable for the [FAA] hear-
ing officer to accept Brettman's testimony that the cited lease provisions would
impose an undue hardship upon his proposed business operation at Pompano
Beach Air Park .... "Id.
Id. In a footnote, the court made the following observations:
For instance, three of the provisions impose upon Brettman financial
obligations which are absent from or less than those imposed by the
leases between the City and the Beckers. The City would have
Brettman make a minimum investment of $500,000, in return for a
thirty-year lease, compared to $200,000 for Pompano Air Center
and $100,000 for Bec-Air. The City sought to require a $5,000 de-
posit at the outset from Brettman, while none was required of either
of the Beckers. Finally, the City proposed to require Brettman to pay
approximately the same rental rate for unimproved land as it is re-
quiring the Beckers to pay for improved land, including taxi-ways,
ramps, and tie-down space which was conveyed to the City by the
federal government.
Id at 1543 n.14.
to' Id. at 1544. The court stated:
Applying the substantial evidence test, we will not disturb the credi-
bility choices the fact finder has made or reevaluate the weight of the
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After emphasizing that the city had unjustly discrimi-
nated against Brettman, the court reviewed why it was
reasonable for the FAA hearing officer to conclude that
Pompano Air Center (owned by John Becker) and Bec-Air
(owned by John Becker's son Brian) enjoyed a monopoly
at the Air Park. Even though they seemed, at first glance,
to be separate competitors, 170 the two businesses were es-
sentially one enterprise. While Pompano Air was a fully
developed FBO, Bec-Air, located next door, was "little
more than a corporate shell."' 7' The two corporations
had interlocking officers, the two owners being father and
son, and the court stated that the senior Becker had cre-
ated Bec-Air for tax purposes rather than have his existing
business absorb the operation.17 2 The court found that
the Beckers enjoyed, in combination with each other, the
type of unacceptable monopoly Congress intended to
prohibit by the passage of section 1349(a) .1  Further, in
an obvious reference to Niswonger,174 the court found that
neither Bec-Air nor Pompano Air had fully developed
their leaseholds. Rather, each had retained "extensive va-
evidence. The hearing officer, relying on his findings that the provi-
sions in the lease proposed by the City to Brettman were unjustly
discriminatory and that the City's delays in negotiating with
Brettman benefited the incumbent lessees, concluded that the City's
conduct had the effect of granting the Beckers an exclusive right at
its Air Park. This is a reasonable application of the law.
ld. at 1543-44.
,-0 Id. at 1543-44.
171 Id. at 1544. See supra notes 2 and 10 for more information about the Beckers'
operations.
172 Pompano Beach, 774 F.2d at 1544. "The two operations have interlocking
officers, with the father and son basically trading positions in the corporate struc-
ture of each operation. The senior Becker purchased Executive Aviation in 1982
and created Bec-Air for tax purposes rather than having his existing company ab-
sorb the operation. Then he installed his son as the senior officer of Bec-Air,
creating the guise of a separate business." IM (emphasis added).
17s Id. "It was reasonable for the hearing officer to conclude that the Beckers'
businesses, in combination with each other, comprised the type of unacceptable
monopoly Congress intended to prohibit when it enacted section 1349(a)." Id
See supra notes 29-39 for a discussion of the congressional intent behind section
1349(a).
" See supra text accompanying notes 133-143 for a discussion of Niswonger.
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cant areas."' 17 5
.Finally, the court of appeals was adamant that "the po-
tential competitive effect of Brettman's operation upon
the Beckers' business was an insufficient reason to deny
access to Brettman."' 176 It stressed that although there was
no evidence that the city expressly agreed to give the
Beckers an exclusive right, such a right can be created
through the imposition of unreasonable standards or re-
quirements on outsiders. 177 Therefore, instead of making
its public airport available to the benefits of competition,
the city, by imposing unreasonable standards and require-
ments, stripped from new competitors the opportunity to
enjoy the rights and privileges held by the Beckers. s78
After discussing these three fact situations as its
17a Pompano Beach, 774 F.2d at 1544. The court stated that "[n~either Bec-Air
nor Pompano Air Center has filly developed all of the land leased from the City;
extensive vacant areas remain on their leaseholds." Id. Brettman never con-
tended that the Beckers had an exclusive right to all available space at the Air Park.
In fact, whether or not the Beckers had fully developed their leaseholds or not is
irrelevant except to the extent that it helped the court to liken its case to Niswonger.
176 Id.
177 Id. In an important section of the opinion the court wrote:
True, there was no evidence that the City by express agreement gave
the Beckers an exclusive right to provide services to fixed-wing air-
craft at the Air Park; witnesses questioned whether such an agree-
ment existed flatly denied the proposition. But an exclusive right may
also be created by imposing on outsiders unreasonable standards or require-
ments. The lease the City offered Brettman, when compared to the
leases it has given the Beckers, made it virtually impossible for
Brettman or any applicant for that matter to start a similar business at
the Air Park and to compete with the Beckers. This is not a case
where the existence of only one enterprise conducting a particular
aeronautical activity at an airport is acceptable because the market
potential is insufficient to attract competitors; the City had an entre-
preneur actively seeking to do business at the airport and represent-
ing that he had investors willing to utilize his proposed facilities. At
least in Brettman's mind a potential market existed to sustain a com-
peting fixed-wing aircraft service center. The potential competitive eflect
of Brettman 's operation upon the Beckers' business was an insuffcient reason to
deny access to Brettman.
I (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
1I7 Id. "Instead of making its public airport available to the benefits of competi-
tive enterprise, the City foreclosed, by imposing unreasonable standards and re-
quirements, the opportunity for others to enjoy the rights and privileges held by
the Beckers." Id
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grounds for affirmance, the Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit concluded by dismissing the city's attempted
justification that each new provision of what it called its
"standard" lease was incorporated to protect the city's,
and thus the public's, interests. 79 Although the city
claimed that the provisions reflected its desire to learn
from experience and to improve the way it does business,
the court emphasized that any modifications made in the
lease extended to Brettman had to have been reasonable
when compared to similar leases offered others at that time
or subsequent thereto .180 The court stressed, therefore, that
City of Pompano Beach should not be interpreted as a signal
to cities and potential airport lessees that all municipal
leases must be identical.18'
170 Id.
The City attempted to justify each of the discriminatory provisions
in the proposed Brettman lease, arguing that they were incorporated
to protect the City's and thus the public's interests. These justifica-
tions, which might have provided an adequate reason for the City's
modification of its standard fixed base operator lease over time,
were insufficient here, in light of the City's conduct vis-a-vis
Brettman.
Iad
t1o Id. at 1545.
We applaud a city's desire to learn from experience and to be ever
watchful for improvements in the way it does business in order to
protect the public's interest; modifications in standard contracts and
leases is one way to accomplish this worthy goal. But in this instance
the clock stopped for the City of Pompano Beach on May 30, 1979,
the date of Brettman's initial request. Any modifications in the lease
the City extends to Brettman must be reasonable when compared to
similar leases offered by the City to others that time or subsequent
thereto.
Id at 1544-45. The court explained why the city's treatment of Brettman differed
from its treatment of the Beckers:
Key to our affirmance of the hearing officer's findings and order is
the fact that the City's contemporaneous treatment of the Beckers
and Brettman differed so markedly. The City last amended its lease
with John Becker and Pompano Air Center in November 1978;
Brettman applied for a lease May 30, 1979; the City granted Execu-
tive Aviation a lease in July 1979; and the City then granted Brian
Becker a lease in November 1981. The differences in these leases
have already been noted; we find no reasonable explanation orjusti-
fication in the record as to why they exist.
Id.
Id. "Contrary to the City's foreboding warning and admonition, our affirm-
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HI. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE INTERPRETATION
GIVEN SECTION 1349(A) IN CITY OF POMPANO
BEACH V. FAA
In City of Pompano Beach v. FAA, 82 the Eleventh Circuit
held that section 1349(a)183 had been violated because
Pompano Beach imposed unreasonable standards upon
Brettman, a lease applicant for airport space. 84 The sin-
gle most important practical implication of Pompano Beach
is that it continues a trend towards a very broad applica-
tion of section 1349(a),185 and it is the first judicial deci-
sion to explicitly hold that the imposition of unreasonable
standards is proscribed by the statute.186
The trend towards a broad interpretation of section
1349(a) began in 1941 with the Attorney General's opin-
ion'87 that section 1349(a), then section 303 of the CAB
Act,' 88 prohibited the granting of an exclusive right for
each aeronautical use of an airport. 189 Originally it had
been suggested that section 1349(a) might only prevent
the grant of an exclusive right if it consisted of the grant
of the sole right to use an entire airport. 90 Then in 1972,
the FAA published an advisory circular' 9' which consider-
ance of the hearing officer's findings and order is not a signal to cities and poten-
tial lessees of municipal property that all municipal leases must be identical." IM
182 774 F.2d at 1529. See supra notes 1-29 for a discussion of the facts of Pompano
Beach. See supra notes 163-182 for a discussion of the holding of Pompano Beach.
-83 49 U.S.C. app. § 1349(a) (1982).
-8 774 F.2d at 1543-45. See supra notes 163-182 for a discussion of the holding
of Pompano Beach.
18- See infra text accompanying notes 187-193 for a discussion of the trend to-
wards a broad interpretation of section 1349(a).
- See infra text accompanying notes 194-212 for a discussion of why Pompano
Beach is the first case to explicitly hold that the imposition of unreasonable stan-
dards is proscribed by the statute.
1-7 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 72 (1941). See supra notes 40-44 for a discussion of the
Attorney General's opinion.
- Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 602, § 303, 52 Stat. 993, 986 (current
version at 49 U.S.C. app. § 1349(a)(1982)). See supra notes 29-38 for a discussion
of the CAB Act, and section 303 in particular.
3-0 See supra notes 40-44 for a discussion of the 1941 Attorney General's
opinion.
-13 40 Op. Att'y Gen. at 72; see supra note 41 for the text of the opinion where
this suggestion was discussed.
it" FAA Advisory Circular No. 150/5190-2A (April 4, 1972), relevant sections re-
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ably broadened the scope of section 1349(a)'s exclusive
right.19 2 In it the FAA stated that an exclusive right could
be conferred by either express grant, imposition of unreason-
able standards or requirements, or any other means.'9
Although the FAA announced in 1972 that the imposi-
tion of unreasonable standards could violate section
1349(a), Pompano Beach is the first judicial decision to ex-
pressly so hold. It could be argued that Aircraft Owners19 4
and Southwest Airlines'9 5 involved claims of imposition of
unreasonable standards, but if closely inspected, both
cases reveal express exclusions and/or discriminations
which distinguish their holdings from Pompano Beach. For
example, in Aircraft Owners, it might appear that the take-
off fees levied against aircraft operating with a seating ca-
pacity of less than twenty-five19 6 were "unreasonable stan-
dards" which were being imposed. However, the
plaintiffs in Aircraft Owners did not contend that the fees
were in and of themselves unreasonable, but rather that
the fact of their being was openly discriminatory.' 9 7  The
fees were not exacted from all aircraft using the airports,
and the plaintiffs found this to be objectionable. 9 8 This
distinction is important, because a claim that the fees were
unreasonable would have forced the court to subjectively
analyze the merits of the fees themselves. Instead, the
conduct complained of in Aircraft Owners, the "discrimina-
printed in Alphin v. Henson, 392 F. Supp. 813, 832-833 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd, 518
F.2d 85 (4th Cir. 1976), modified on other grounds, 552 F.2d 1033 (4th Cir.), cer.
denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1977). See supra notes 58-68 for a discussion of the 1972
Advisory Circular.
-9 See supra note 64 for a discussion of how the FAA broadened the scope of
section 1349(a)'s "exclusive right" in its 1972 Advisory Circular.
193 See supra notes 58-68 for a general discussion of the 1972 Advisory Circular.
See supra note 64 for the relevant text of the circular in which this language
appears.
-o See supra notes 82-92 for a discussion of Aircraft Owners.
-' See supra notes 94-132 for a discussion of Southwest Airlines. See supra notes
158-160 for a discussion of the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of Southwest Air-
lines in Pompano Beach.
305 F. Supp. at 96.
hi .L at 101; see also supra note 89 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
plaintiffs' claim that the take-off fee was discriminatory.
i's 305 F. Supp. at 101.
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tory" enforcement of the fee, was readily apparent. The
court had merely to decide whether the selective imposi-
tion of the take-off fees - used to relieve congestion at
the airports and to promote safety' 99 - was the type of
conduct prohibited by section 1349(a).
Southwest Airlines200 was a broader decision than Aircraft
Owners, and is therefore more like Pompano Beach.
Although Southwest Airlines was not expressly excluded
from Love Field and, therefore, no exclusive right was ex-
pressly granted to the air carriers who remained,01
Southwest Airlines, nevertheless, did not have unreasona-
ble standards imposed against it. It instead complained of
an express ordinance which arbitrarily dictated what types of
air service could remain at Love Field and what types had
to be transferred to the new Regional Airport.202 Like Air-
craft Owners, the conduct complained of was explicit and
undeniable - no subjective analysis of "standards" or
other conduct was required. In fact, the exclusion of
Southwest Airlines from Love Field was as close to being
"express" as an exclusion can get: Southwest Airlines was
the only air carrier affected by the ordinance,2 0 3 a fact
readily ascertainable at the time the ordinance was
passed.
Pompano Beach, unlike Aircraft Owners or Southwest Airlines,
did not involve an easily identifiable policy, ordinance, or
act that was found to be objectionable. 0 4 Instead, the
Eleventh Circuit weighed the facts as whole, stating sev-
eral conclusions which may or may not have been suffi-
-o 305 F. Supp. at 106; see supra note 93 for the relevant text of the Aircraft
Owners decision.
2- See supra notes 94-132 for a discussion of Southwest Airlines.
20' See supra notes 99-106 and accompanying text for a discussion of how South-
west Airlines was excluded from Love Field.
- See supra notes 99-106 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ordi-
nance and its classification system.
" See supra notes 99-106 and accompanying text for a discussion of how South-
west Airlines was the only air carrier excluded from Love Field under the
ordinance.
-4 See supra notes 1-28 for a discussion of the facts of Pompano Beach. See supra
notes 144-182 for a discussion of the holding in Pompano Beach.
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cient by themselves to support a judgment, and
determined that the facts indicated uniquely unjust dis-
crimination, 0 5 the intentional imposition of unreasonable
standards, 0 6 and the grant of an exclusive right to the
Beckers.2 °7 The distinction between these findings and
the holdings in Aircraft Owners and Southwest Airlines can
best be described by language in the Pompano Beach deci-
sion itself. "[T]he different provisions in the proposed
Brettman lease are not unjustly discriminatory per se .... But
based upon the evidence in the record, the hea:ing officer
was entitled to find that they were unjustly discrimina-
tory. ' 20 8 If the take-off fees in Aircraft Owners had been
found to be discriminatory and in violation of section
1349(a), it would have been because they were discrimina-
tory per se. The fact that they were imposed against some
aircraft and not others would have made them discrimina-
tory. However, in Pompano Beach, the mere fact that the
lease provisions offered Brettman differed from those of-
fered incumbent lessees does not seem to have been the
key to the court's decision. 20 9 The court emphasized that
the provisions not only differed, but also impaired Brettman's
ability to compete with the incumbent FBOs.21 0 Impairing
Brettman's ability to compete - a fact only discovered
from Brettman's testimony concerning the impact of the
lease provisions on his proposed business 2 1 - was a dis-
criminatory effect not readily apparent on the face of the lease.
Therefore, not only was Pompano Beach the first case to
find a violation of section 1349(a) through the imposition
205 Pompano Beach, 774 F.2d at 1543. See supra notes 166-169 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the uniquely discriminatory effect of the city's conduct
towards Brettman.
2o Pompano Beach, 774 F.2d at 1544. See supra note 177 for the relevant text of
the opinion.
207 Pompano Beach, 774 F.2d at 1543.44. See supra note 169 for the relevant text
of the opinion.
208 Pompano Beach, 774 F.2d at 1543. See supra note 166 for the entire text of this
quote.
20- See Pompano Beach, 774 F.2d at 1543-45.
210 Id at 1543; see supra note 168 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
effect of the provisions on Brettman's ability to compete at the Air Park.
21, See Pompano Beach, 774 F.2d at 1543.
1987] CASENOTES AND STATUTE NOTES
of unreasonable standards, but the "unreasonableness"
criteria was broadly construed. Though the standards
were not unreasonable on their face, they were found to
be unreasonable in light of the facts of the case.
In conclusion, the single most important practical im-
plication of Pompano Beach is that it continues a trend to-
wards a broad interpretation of section 1349(a), and that
it is the first judicial decision to explicitly hold that the
imposition of unreasonable standards is proscribed by the
statute.212 Additionally, Pompano Beach is an important de-
cision for a few other reasons. First, section 1349(a) has
such a scant body of interpretative case history213 that
Pompano Beach will certainly be referred to in future deci-
sions discussing section 1349(a). Second, since the deci-
sion involved a subjective consideration of the facts of the
case,21 4 no clear cut standard of conduct emerges. Pom-
pano Beach could "open the floodgates" of litigation to
plaintiffs seeking access to airport space. With no clear
cut standard being evident in the opinion, Pompano Beach
could certainly be advocated as espousing a much more
liberal approach to section 1349(a) than the Eleventh Cir-
cuit intended. Finally, Pompano Beach involved a fact situa-
tion much more common than Southwest Airlines, the only
other major case finding an implicit grant of exclusive
right.21 5 Southwest Airlines involved a one time distribution
of air service between a new regional airport and the ex-
isting municipal airports. Pompano Beach, on the other
hand, involved a city's reluctance to allow an additional
FBO to compete at its airport, the reluctance of incum-
bent FBOs to give up any of their business, and an appli-
cant for lease space that was determined. True, the FAA's
hearing officer found that the city had intentionally
212 See supra text accompanying notes 183-211 for a discussion of the most im-
portant practical implication of Pompano Beach.
21s See supra notes 73-143 for a discussion of the judicial interpretation of sec-
tion 1349(a) before the Pompano Beach decision.
21 See supra text accompanying notes 204-212 for a discussion of the court's
subjective analysis of the facts in Pompano Beach.
213 See supra notes 94-132 for a discussion of Southwest Airlines.
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thwarted Brettman's attempts to gain access to the Air
Park because it sought to shield the Beckers from compe-
tition, but it does not seem that the city's conduct 21 6 was
overly egregious on its face. Situations analogous to the
one addressed in Pompano Beach could occur fairly often in
the future.
Diane Norwood
211, See Pompano Beach, 774 F.2d at 1544.
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